eNotes: Liability – October 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Phillips v. Altair Real Estate Servs.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2024 WL 4052199, 2024 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2223

Decided: September 5, 2024

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania Expands the “hills and ridges” liability defense to apply to snow removal entities in negligence actions.

Background

This negligence action arises from an alleged slip-and-fall on a concrete sidewalk during a snowstorm in January 2019. At the time of this alleged fall, there was an active accumulation of freezing rain and generally slippery conditions prevailing in the community. To that end, Plaintiff averred in his Complaint that Defendants (the premises owner, the property manager, and the general contractor responsible for snow and ice removal at the premises) were each negligent for allegedly failing to salt the icy sidewalk, and in any event, for failing to make the slippery conditions safe. At the Trial Court, Defendants sought dismissal of the Complaint and subsequently filed a Motion for summary judgment on the basis that the “hills and ridges” doctrine shielded them from liability and entitled them to judgment as a matter of law. The Court agreed and this appeal followed.

At the outset of its Opinion, the Superior Court delineated this doctrine to serve as a refinement of the duty owed by a possessor of land. Simply put, it protects an owner or occupier of land from liability for generally slippery conditions resulting from ice and snow where the owner has not permitted it to unreasonably accumulate in ridges or elevations. A heightened burden is imposed on a plaintiff to prove that the snow and ice on a sidewalk was of such size and character to constitute a substantial obstruction to travel. In light of this, Plaintiff argued on appeal that, inter alia, the Trial Court erred in granting Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed and because the Trial Court improperly applied the hills and ridges doctrine to a general contractor (the snow and ice removal company) when, in fact, it ostensibly only applies to land owners. The Superior Court was not persuaded.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. The Court began its analysis by explaining that summary judgment was proper because no genuine dispute of material fact existed as to the applicability of the hills and ridges doctrine when the record was devoid of evidence of any differing thickness of the ice in the area of the fall, or of ridges, hills, or elevations of any size. To the extent that Plaintiff argued that this doctrine is not applicable to general contractors hired to remove snow and ice, the Court clarified that snow removal entities are protected to the same degree as a landowner when they are alleged to be negligent based on a theory of tort liability. The Court concluded its Opinion by emphasizing the rule that a landowner or snow removal entity has no obligation to correct the slippery conditions until a reasonable time after the winter storm has ended.

Questions about this case can be directed to Haley Obrzut at (717)-255-7646 or hobrzut@tthlaw.com.

Lucykanish v. Flurer
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 541 EDA 2024, 2024 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2142

Decided: August 7, 2024

Court addresses the admissibility of evidence related to failure to wear seat belt in auto accident case.

Background

This lawsuit arose from a motor vehicle accident resulting in serious injuries to the passenger. On May 7, 2021, Lori Lucykanish was seated in the right, rear passenger seat of a 2017 Ford pick-up truck driven by Defendant Robert Flurer. There were two other passengers in the vehicle, Heidi George seated in the left, rear passenger seat, and Shawn George seated in the front, right passenger seat. At some point during the ride, Heidi dropped her cellphone and, to help her locate her device, Lucykanish removed her seat belt and joined the search. It was at this time that another vehicle tried to pass Flurer’s vehicle on the right and cut back into the left lane. Flurer applied the brakes to avoid striking the car in front of him and causing a collision. Due to the sudden application of the brakes, Lucykanish struck her head on the center console, and suffered various injuries.

Lucykanish alleged that Flurer was negligent in operating the vehicle at an excessive speed in a construction zone, failing to maintain control of the vehicle, and applying the brakes suddenly and without adequate notice. She argued that it was this negligent driving that caused her injuries. Flurer admitted that the accident occurred but argued that Lucykanish’s injuries were caused or exacerbated by her failure to wear a seat belt, and it was this failure to wear a seat belt that was the proximate cause of her injuries. Flurer contended that Lucykanish’s injuries would have been less severe if she had been wearing a seat belt. The Trial Court granted summary judgement in favor of Flurer and dismissed Lucykanish’s Complaint. The Trial Court found that Lucykanish’s injuries were primarily the result of her own negligence in not wearing her seat belt and that Flurer’s actions were reasonable to avoid a collision. Lucykanish appealed this judgement arguing that this evidence regarding her failure to wear a seat belt at the time of the accident was inadmissible under Pennsylvania law, which expressly prohibits the use of seat belt evidence in civil actions.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania reversed the Trial Court’s decision and found that the Trial Court erred in considering the seat belt evidence. Pennsylvania statute, 75 Pa.C.S. § 4581(e), clearly states that the use of seat belt evidence is prohibited in civil actions. Thus, the Appellate Court concluded that this evidence should have been excluded. The Appellate Court went on to remand the case for further proceedings, noting that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the proximate cause of Lucykanish’s injuries. The Court stated that the evidence related to Flurer’s speed and sudden braking of the vehicle should have been considered without regard to Lucykanish’s seat belt status. In essence, the Court ruled that the Trial Court’s decision was based on inadmissible evidence and thus the case should be retried without considering the seat belt evidence.

Questions about this case can be directed to Jhanvi Jamindar at (717) 441-7056 or jjamindar@tthlaw.com.

Ortiz v. Lincoln Elec. Automation, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1384 EDA 2023

Decided: June 26, 2024

Superior Court affirms that a borrowed employee cannot sue the owner of the workplace and is limited to remedies under the Workers’ Compensation Act.

Background

Plaintiff Jasmin Ortiz appealed the decision of the Northampton County Court of Common Pleas, which made final the Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of PAC Worldwide Corporation and PAC Worldwide Corporation World Headquarters (collectively “PAC Worldwide”). Ortiz filed a Complaint against PAC Worldwide seeking damages for injuries she sustained while working on an industrial machine at the facility. At the time of the alleged 2019 injury, Ortiz was working as a packer at the end of a machine. A majority of the packers who worked at the end of a machine are employees of PAC Worldwide and a small percentage, including Oritz, were from a temporary service. Adecco was one of the temporary services PAC Worldwide utilized for obtaining temporary workers.
The issue before the Trial Court was whether Oritz was an employee of PAC Worldwide or Adecco. If Oritz was an employee of Adecco, she would have standing to sue PAC Worldwide on a theory of negligence, but if she was an employee of PAC Worldwide, her sole remedy would be under the Workers’ Compensation Act. The test for whether a company is a worker’s employer under the borrowed employee doctrine rests on which entity exercised control over the employee. The Trial Court found that because Ortiz was supervised by PAC employees while working at the facility, she was clearly subject to the direction and control of PAC Worldwide and therefore, she was an employee of PAC Worldwide under the borrowed employee doctrine.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision that Ortiz was a borrowed employee under the borrowed employee doctrine and therefore could not sue PAC Worldwide. The Superior Court stated that the undisputed evidence established that while Adecco hired and paid Ortiz, PAC Worldwide, and not Adecco, had the right to control Ortiz’s work and the manner in which it was performed. The test to establish a borrowed employee is whether PAC Worldwide had the right to direct and control Ortiz’s work and the manner of its performance, which was clearly established, according to the Superior Court. This finding that PAC Worldwide was Ortiz’s employer limits Ortiz’s recovery to those remedies provided in the Workers’ Compensation Act and creates immunity for PAC Worldwide from tort liability to Ortiz.

Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.