eNotes: Liability – April 2023 – New Jersey

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

New Jersey Case Summaries

Y.H. v. T.C. and Uber Techs., Inc.
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
No. A-1966-21, ___ N.J. Super. ____

Decided: March 16, 2023

In this assault and personal injury case, the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division (“Appellate Division”) reviewed the disclosure and admissibility of an expunged criminal record, finding that Defendant’s expunged conviction could not be used against him, but might be evidential regarding that Defendant’s employer’s decision to hire and retain the Defendant’s services.

Background

Defendant T.C., an Uber driver, was picking up a passenger at a supermarket where Plaintiff Y.H. worked. Plaintiff Y.H. confronted Defendant T.C. for parking in a non-parking zone. The incident escalated to a physical encounter that resulted in Y.H. suffering a cervical spinal injury and quadriplegia. Plaintiff and his spouse sued Defendant and Uber for the injury. Plaintiffs asserted that Uber was liable under a theory of negligent hiring or negligent employment. Defendant T.C. had been convicted of simple assault in 1991, arrested for aggravated assault in 1996, and convicted of aggravated assault on a law enforcement officer in 2006.

T.C. was approved to begin driving for Uber on the day that the Transportation Network Companies Act went into effect. Uber subsequently ran a background check on T.C. and that background check revealed his 2006 aggravated assault conviction. Defendant T.C. later obtained expungement of his convictions. However, the record was unclear as to when and how Defendant Uber may have learned about the expungement. Plaintiffs sought to admit Defendant’s expunged conviction records in support of its vicarious liability and negligent hiring/employment claims against Uber.

The Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division Motion Judge denied Plaintiffs’ Motion. The Motion Judge found that under New Jersey’s expungement statute an expunged conviction was deemed to not exist. The Motion Judge further found that the disclosure of an expunged record constituted a disorderly persons offense.

Holding

Plaintiffs appealed to the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division (“Appellate Division”), arguing that the Motion Judge below had improperly expanded the scope of the expungement statute. The Appellate Division, however, affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part. The Appellate Division agreed that Defendant T.C.’s expunged conviction could not be used against him. However, the records were relevant, and therefore potentially admissible, as to the issue of whether Defendant Uber had continued to permit Defendant to drive for its service with knowledge of his conviction and, potentially, without notice of the subsequent expungement.

Questions about this case can be directed to Mark Sander at (856) 334-0415 ext. 8915 or msander@tthlaw.com.

Pfannenstein v. Surrey
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
No. A-3005-21, ___ N.J. Super. ____

Decided: March 7, 2023

In this medical malpractice case, the Appellate Division reviewed the New Jersey Medical Care Access and Responsibility and Patients First Act (“PFA”), N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-37-42; and found that the PFA’s kind-for-kind specialty requirement embodied in N.J.S.A. 2A:53A-41(a) is not satisfied when the expert executing the Affidavit of Merit (“AOM”) specialized in a subspecialty of the treating doctor’s specialty, but did not specialize, nor was board certified, in the Defendant physician’s specialty.

Background

Plaintiff Janan Pfannenstein, individually and as Administrator of the Estate of John Pfannenstein, filed suit alleging that Defendants Christine Surrey, D.O. and Bhavikaben Babaria, M.D., were negligent in treating Plaintiff’s husband and caused his death. As required by statute, Plaintiff timely submitted the AOM of Dr. Biree Andemarian, a board-certified specialist in hematology. Dr. Andemarian asserted that hematology was “the subject matter involved in this action.” Dr. Andemarian did not indicate that she specialized or was board-certified in internal medicine, even though both Defendants specialized in that field and one was board-certified in that field.

Defendants moved to dismiss the case due to alleged kind-for-kind deficiencies in Plaintiff’s AOM. Defendants argued that the treatment provided to Plaintiff’s husband involved the practice of internal medicine and that neither of them specialized or were board-certified in hematology. Plaintiff opposed their Motion, asserting that Defendants’ negligence involved the allegedly improper prescription of heparin, which involved hematology as a subspecialty of internal medicine.

Holding

The Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, denied the Defendants’ Motion, finding that the alleged malpractice involved the use of heparin and that the case fit within and related to the field of hematology. On appeal, Defendants renewed their argument that Plaintiff’s AOM failed to meet the kind-for-kind specialty requirement of the PFA. The Appellate Division agreed with the Defendants’ arguments and reversed the Trial Court Motion Judge’s ruling. The Court ruled that the kind-for-kind requirement was not satisfied when an AOM affiant specialized in a subspecialty of the treating provider’s specialty when the provider did not specialize in that subspecialty.

Questions about this case can be directed to Mark Sander at (856) 334-0415 ext. 8915 or msander@tthlaw.com.

Castano v. Augustine
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
No. A-3925-21, ___ N.J. Super. ____ (App. Div. 2023)

Decided: March 5, 2023

In this motor vehicle negligence case, the Superior Court of New Jersey Appellate Division (“Appellate Division”) found that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) requires that there be a driving while intoxicated (“DWI”) conviction or guilty plea, before this statute will preclude a negligence claim.

Background

Plaintiff George Castano was riding his motorcycle, after drinking at three different bars. He alleged that a tractor-trailer, owned by Defendant NFI Interactive Logistics, LLC, pulled out of a parking lot in front of him, and he had to down-shift his motorcycle to try to prevent an accident. He struck the truck’s bumper anyway, and was injured. The police responded to the scene, but did not issued any summonses to the Plaintiff. Blood was drawn from Plaintiff at the hospital, where he was treated, and Defendant’s expert extrapolated that he had a BAC of .159 at the time of the accident. Defendants moved for summary judgment and argued that N.J.S.A. 39:6A-4.5(b) applied because Plaintiff was legally intoxicated at the time of the accident and, as a result, Plaintiff was barred from pursuing a negligence claim. Plaintiff asserted that there was a genuine issue as to whether he was legally intoxicated and that, because he neither pled guilty to nor was convicted of DWI, the statute did not apply to bar his claim.

The Superior Court of New Jersey Law Division Motion Judge found that Plaintiff’s intoxication was a disputed issue of material fact, and denied the Defendants’ Motion.

Holding

On appeal to the Appellate Division, Defendants argued that the Trial Court misapplied the law and mistakenly found that there was a dispute as to Plaintiff’s BAC. The Appellate Division affirmed the Trial Court Motion Judge, but on different grounds. The Appellate panel of three Judges found that the statutory language was plain and unambiguous and required a conviction for DWI.

Questions about this case can be directed to Mark Sander at (856) 334-0415 ext. 8915 or msander@tthlaw.com.

Memudu v. Gonzalez
New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division
No. A-0110-23, ___ N.J. Super. ____

N.J.S.A. 39:6A4.5(a) operates to bar an uninsured vehicle owner from bringing suit for injuries suffered as a result of his operation of the uninsured vehicle. Although prior cases applying this statute did find that it bars uninsured owners injured while riding as passengers in their vehicles, here the injuries suffered by the Decedent in a second accident, minutes later, at the same location, were deemed unrelated to the operation of the uninsured vehicle and, therefore, the bar did not apply.

Background

On October 26, 2019, Najim Memudu (“Decedent”) was driving a 2007 Lexus southbound on the New Jersey Turnpike in Edison. Driving behind Decedent, was a vehicle owned by A-1 Limousine and operated by Khawaja Hameed (“A-1 Defendants”), which rear-ended Decedent’s vehicle. After the accident, Decedent’s vehicle was disabled. A tow truck driver came to the scene, and noticed debris on the road and Decedent standing outside of his vehicle. The tow truck driver turned on the beacon lights on the top of his vehicle, along with floodlights and hazard lights. Decedent requested to use the tow truck driver’s cell phone light to search for his cell phone inside his Lexus. At that time, the front portion of Decedent’s vehicle was partially in the left travel lane, and the rear of the vehicle was on the shoulder. As Decedent was searching for his cell phone, Defendant Joshua Gonzalez crashed into the front passenger side of the Decedent’s uninsured Lexus. Approximately thirty minutes elapsed between the first and second accident. Decedent was pronounced dead at the scene. Plaintiff subsequently filed a Complaint, alleging claims under the Wrongful Death Act and the Survivor Act. N.J.S.A 2A:31-1-6; N.J.S.A 2A:15-3.

Following the completion of discovery, the A-1 Defendants and Defendants Joshua M. Gonzalez, W. Campbell Holdings, LLC, Campbell Freightliner of Orange County, LLC, Campbell Group Associates, LLC, and W. Campbell Supply Company, LLC (“Gonzalez Defendants”) filed Motions for summary judgment, asserting that the lawsuit was barred by N.J.S.A. 39:6A4.5(a), which operates to bar an uninsured vehicle owner from bringing suit for injuries suffered as a result of his operation of the uninsured vehicle. The Trial Court denied the Gonzalez Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment. The A-1 Defendants’ Motion was granted. The Gonzalez Defendants thereafter filed for leave to appeal. That Motion was denied; however, they moved for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, which did permit the appeal and remanded the case to the Appellate Division to be considered.

Holding

Defendants argued that there was a substantial nexus between the first and second accidents. The Appellate Division rejected Defendants’ arguments and affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of summary judgment to Defendants. The Court found that the record clearly established that Decedent was not operating his vehicle at the time of the second accident; and that there was a significant period of time between the first and second accidents. The Court noted that prior cases applying the statute to uninsured owners injured while riding as passengers in their vehicles did so to prevent uninsured drivers from avoiding the statutory bar by having someone else drive their vehicles.

Questions about this case can be directed to Mark Sander at (856) 334-0415 ext. 8915 or msander@tthlaw.com.