eNotes: Liability – November 2023 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Klar v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 29 WAP 2022

Decided: August 22, 2023

Non-licensed hosts who organize events where attendees pay for self-serve alcohol meet social host criteria and are therefore not liable under the Pennsylvania Liquor Code for injuries resulting from an intoxicated guest’s actions.

Background

Dairy Farmers of America, Inc. (“DFA”) sponsored a golf outing in 2014. As a condition of attendance, DFA required employees to contribute money to cover expenses, including greens fees, food, and alcohol. One of DFA’s employees, who had a history of alcohol-related issues, attended the event and drank excessively. With a blood alcohol concentration far above the legal limit, the employee left the event and collided with Plaintiff, who was operating a motorcycle, causing severe injuries.

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit against both the employee and DFA, arguing that they were jointly and severally liable for his injuries. Plaintiff claimed that DFA should be held liable for providing alcohol to the employee, knowing he was visibly intoxicated and a habitual drinker. DFA filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings, contending that it couldn’t be held liable for Plaintiff’s injuries, as it was not a licensee under the Liquor Code and merely acted as a social host. The Trial Court granted DFA’s Motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s claims. The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, stating that DFA, as a non-licensee, was not subject to the standard applicable to licensees under the Dram Shop Act.

Holding

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court granted allocatur to examine whether DFA, as a non-licensed host that organized an event where attendees paid for self-serve alcohol, was liable for the injuries caused when an intoxicated guest left the event. The Court concluded that DFA should not be held liable under the Pennsylvania Liquor Code for its actions. It reasoned that DFA, as a non-licensee, could not be subject to the same standards applicable to licensees under the Liquor Code. Additionally, the Court determined that DFA’s actions fell within the scope of a social host, and thus, it was not liable for the injuries sustained by a third party due to an intoxicated guest’s actions. This decision clarified the liability of non-licensed hosts in cases where alcohol is provided to guests in exchange for a fee, establishing that such hosts may not be held liable under the Liquor Code in Pennsylvania.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matt Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

McLaughlin v. Nahata
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 7 WAP 2022

Decided: July 28, 2023

Denial of Motion for summary judgment requesting preclusion of contribution and indemnity claims affirmed.

Background

Mrs. McLaughlin sustained severe and permanent neurological injuries while receiving treatment at Washington Hospital (“Hospital”) from several physicians (“Doctors”) who were employed by Dialysis Clinic, Inc. (“DCI”) and who maintained staff privileges at the Hospital. Mrs. McLaughlin and her husband filed suit. Following the Hospital’s crossclaim against DCI seeking, inter alia, contribution and indemnity, the Trial Court severed the Hospital’s cross-claim from McLaughlins’ claims and ordered that they be resolved at separate trials. The McLaughlins dismissed all claims against the Hospital except for “claims of ostensible agency” for liability arising from the conduct of the Doctors.

Following a bench trial regarding the case between the McLaughlins, the Doctors, and the Hospital, the Trial Court found that the Doctors were negligent in their treatment of Mrs. McLaughlin and entered a verdict against the Doctors and the Hospital. Regarding the Hospital’s cross-claim, the Hospital and DCI filed Cross-Motions for summary judgment. The Hospital argued that it proved its right to contribution and indemnity because the Doctors were operating within the course and scope of their employment with DCI at the relevant times and that the Hospital was required to pay the liabilities of DCI’s employees at no fault of the Hospital. DCI argued that the Hospital was not entitled to either contribution or indemnity.

After consideration of the Cross-Motions for summary judgment, the Trial Court denied both Motions. The Court reasoned that contrary to DCI’s contentions, the law supported the Hospital’s right to seek contribution and indemnity from DCI as the Doctors’ actual employer. As to the Hospital’s Motion, the Court held that questions of material fact remained as to whether either or both the parties exercised control over the Doctors. DCI filed an interlocutory appeal with the Superior Court, which affirmed the Trial Court. The Superior Court agreed almost entirely with the Trial Court’s rationale, only adding that DCI had identified expert witnesses that could show the Hospital’s active fault and defeat its indemnity claim.

Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed and remanded it with instructions to the Trial Court for further proceedings. The Supreme Court began by reasoning that contribution principles in Pennsylvania are governed by the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasor Act (“UCATA”). Following an analysis including statutory analysis of Section 8322 under UCATA and relevant case law, the Court held that two parties that are vicariously liable for a common agent qualify as joint tortfeasors. As a consequence, the Court concluded that the Hospital was permitted to seek contribution against DCI pursuant to Section 8324(a) under UCATA. As to indemnification, the Court was divided, but affirmed the Superior Court’s holding on this issue as well.

Questions about this case can be directed to Thomas Lopez at (717) 441-7057 or tlopez@tthlaw.com.

Quiah v. Devereux Found., Inc.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 408 C.D. 2021

Decided: September 18, 2023

Commonwealth Court addresses time limits for filing in state court after federal court dismissal.

Background

Plaintiff was working as a supervisor for Defendant. She was fired after an internal investigation for accusations of misuse of funds. Defendant contacted the police, and in 2015 Plaintiff was charged with theft by unlawful taking, theft by deception, and receiving stolen property. She was found not guilty on all counts. Plaintiff filed civil suit against, inter alia, Defendant in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. She made claims for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and conspiracy, among several claims in federal law. The federal claims were dismissed with prejudice on September 22, 2020, with leave to pursue the state claims in state court. Defendant presented without opposition a “motion of clarification,” again with leave for Plaintiff to purse the state claims on October 6, 2020.

Plaintiff filed a new Complaint against Defendant with the state law claims on October 23, 2020. The new Complaint amended several claims, including modifying, adding and removing fact averments. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections alleging the new Complaint did not conform to 42 Pa.C.S. § 5103(b)(2) by failing to include federal transcripts and related pleadings, and filing beyond the thirty day tolling period allowed by 28 U.S.C. § 1367(d). Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint on November 25, 2020 and Defendant renewed their Objections. The Trial Court sustained the Objections, as Plaintiff did not appropriately transfer the case in accordance with the plain requirements of § 5103 prohibiting new pleadings. Plaintiff appealed.

Holding

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the holding of the Trial Court. The Court held that Plaintiff did not effectuate a transfer in accordance with § 5103 with their October 23, 2020 Complaint. The time period beyond the statute of limitations granted by the Federal Court would have, at most, extended the time to perfect transfer and file a Complaint until November 5, 2020. Accordingly, the Court held that the statute of limitations had run after November 5, 2020, and her Amended Complaint was improper. The Court explained that to allow the amended filing to remedy conformance with the statute after the expiration of the statute of limitations had passed would “eviscerate” the statutory scheme and allow a run around to its clear mandates. The Trial Court’s ruling was affirmed and the Amended Complaint dismissed with prejudice.

Questions about this case can be directed to Logan Nagle at (717) 255-7234 or lnagle@tthlaw.com.

Fraser v. O’Black
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1200 WDA 2022, 2023 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 2475

Decided: October 6, 2023

The Superior Court, in a non-precedential decision, reiterated that a possessor of land owes a duty to a licensee only in the presence of three specific criteria related to: (1) knowledge; (2) failure to exercise reasonable care; and (3) licensee’s lack of knowledge.

Background

Plaintiff, a 21 year old, attended a pool party at Defendant Homeowner’s house. Defendant Homeowners had an inflatable raft, to be used for towing behind a boat, floating in the pool. The raft at issue had a warning on it that prohibited diving onto the raft, but Defendant Homeowners had covered the warning, and did not warn Plaintiff not to dive or jump onto the raft. Plaintiff either dove or jumped into the pool, hit the raft, and struck his head on the cement, resulting in severe injuries rendering him a quadriplegic. Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant Homeowners sounding in negligence for permitting the raft to be placed in the pool and for failing to warn.

At trial, the jury found Defendant Homeowners 70% liable and Plaintiff 30% liable. After molding pursuant to the finding of comparative negligence, Plaintiff was awarded $13.3M. Defendant Homeowners filed Post-Trial Motions, which were denied. Defendant Homeowners then appealed to the Superior Court arguing, among other things, that a new trial is required because Plaintiff proved neither that Defendant Homeowners knew the raft was a dangerous condition and that Plaintiff did not know or have reason to know of the danger.

Holding

The Superior Court reiterated that a possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm caused to licensees by a condition of the land only if: (1) the possessor knows or has reason to know of the condition and should realize it involves an unreasonable risk of harm, and should expect that licensees will not discover or realize the danger; (2) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to make the condition safe, or to warn the licensees; and (3) the licensees do not know or have reason to know of the condition and risk involved. All three criteria must be present for a duty to attach; where reasonable minds could differ, it is a question for the jury. The Court then held that Defendant Homeowners did not waive their challenge to the weight of the evidence related to the duty owed to Plaintiff, vacated judgment, and remanded to the Trial Court for consideration in the first instance. Defendant Homeowners’ other grounds for appeal were found waived, resulted in harmless error, or that the Trial Court engaged in no abuse of discretion.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.

Sinoracki v. Children’s Serv. Ctr. Of Wyoming Valley
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. LEXIS 411

Decided: September 19, 2023

Mental health providers’ duty to warn third party limited to readily identifiable individuals.

Background

A minor was diagnosed with an inoperable arteriovenous malformation. This condition led to numerous psychological issues as he aged. Eventually, the minor’s parents sought help at the Children’s Service Center of Wyoming Valley (“CSC”). The minor was seen for aggressive and erratic behavior. During his treatment from 2014 through 2016, the minor exhibited suicidal ideation and increased aggression. In August of 2016, the minor threatened to kill his father. However, the minor’s aggression was not limited to his family and also included instances of throwing rocks at vehicles passing by his house.

In August of 2016, while hospitalized for his deteriorating mental health, the minor was diagnosed with mood dysregulation disorder, cannabis-induced psychotic disorder, and cannabis use disorder. He was rated a low risk on the homicide risk assessment score. The minor was discharged to his home on August 29, 2016. The minor continued exhibiting deteriorating mental health after discharge. On September 10, 2016, he was seen at CSC. Although CSC was made aware of the minor’s condition, they did not recommend involuntary commitment at that time. On September 11, 2016, the minor attacked and killed his sibling. The minor’s family sued CSC, alleging that CSC owed and violated a duty to the minor’s family.

Holding

The Court determined that CSC owed no duty to the minor’s family. The Court did recognize that in limited circumstances, a mental health provider may owe a duty to a third party. However, for such a duty to exist, the third party must be readily identifiable. The minor in question had made general threats and also acted aggressively towards the general public, such that his mental health provider, CSC, would not have reasonably been able to readily identify that his sibling was in danger.

Questions about this case can be directed to Ryan Hatfield, at (412) 926-1422 or rhatfield@tthlaw.com.

Moffitt v. Miller
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 168

Decided: September 18, 2023

In personal injury cases involving careless or reckless driving, the admissibility of blood alcohol content (“BAC”) evidence, and the use of expert testimony to establish impairment based on BAC, should be determined at the discretion of the Trial Court on a case-by-case basis.

Background

Colleen Moffitt appealed a judgment in a personal injury case against Chris Miller, following a 2018 motor vehicle accident. The incident occurred when Miller’s car struck Moffitt as she crossed a road, with Moffitt having a high blood alcohol content (“BAC”) at the time. Moffitt sustained a fracture to her right leg necessitating surgery and cuts and bruises around her head. The Trial Court permitted testimony from an expert and several witnesses, including Moffitt, the police officer who responded to the scene, and the bartender who had served Moffitt. The jury found both parties equally negligent and awarded Moffitt $8,500 in damages. Moffitt appealed, raising concerns about the admission of evidence related to her blood alcohol level.

Holding

The Superior Court cited the case of Coughlin v. Massaquoi, which held that BAC evidence can be admissible when dealing with cases involving careless or reckless driving. Coughlin emphasized that the admissibility of BAC evidence should be determined on a case-by-case basis, at the discretion of the trial court. The Court also noted that expert testimony about the effects of a specific BAC on a person’s behavior can provide corroborating evidence of impairment.

In Moffitt’s case, the Superior Court found that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the BAC evidence. The Court also emphasized that the use of expert testimony to establish impairment based on BAC was valid. Moffitt’s contention that the Coughlin Court’s expert testimony rule only applied when there were no witnesses was dismissed by the Court. The Court affirmed the judgment entered below.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matt Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

Freeman v. Akiladelphia Creative Cont., LLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 165

Decided: September 13, 2023

The arbitration clause within a home improvement contract was declared invalid because it failed to meet five out of the six requirements specified by the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act.

Background

In November 2021, Plaintiff, Jill Freeman, entered into a home improvement contract with Defendants, Akiladelphia Creative Contracting, LLC, and its owner, Akil Bowler, to renovate her Philadelphia condominium for approximately $55,800. The contract contained a dispute resolution provision requiring the parties to attempt friendly negotiations and, if necessary, resolve disputes through mediation and binding arbitration. In June 2022, Freeman notified the Defendants that they were in default for not completing the work in a timely and workmanlike manner and filed a Complaint against them for various claims. The Defendants filed Preliminary Objections seeking to compel arbitration, but the Trial Court overruled their objections based on the arbitration clause’s failure to meet the requirements of the Home Improvement Consumer Protection Act (“HICPA”). The Defendants appealed this decision, claiming that the Trial Court erred in denying their Preliminary Objections.

Holding

The arbitration clause was found to be invalid under the HICPA due to its failure to meet several specific requirements. Notably, the arbitration clause did not meet the following HICPA requirements: the text was not in capital letters, it was not printed in 12-point boldface type and was not on a separate page from the rest of the contract, it lacked a separate line for each party’s assent, it was not signed and dated by the parties, and it did not explicitly state whether the details of the dispute and related documents would be confidential. As a result, the Superior Court upheld the Trial Court’s decision to overrule the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections, thereby allowing the case to proceed in court rather than arbitration.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matt Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.