eNotes: Liability – December 2023 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Coryell v. Morris
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1977 EDA 2021

Decided: November 8, 2023

The Superior Court, in a split decision, vacated judgment, holding that the franchisor-franchisee relationship did not create a master-servant relationship between Domino’s and Robizza, and therefore, Domino’s was not vicariously liable as a matter of law.

Background

This case arose from a motor vehicle accident with a pizza delivery driver. The injured party sued the delivery driver, the franchise owner (Robizza), and the franchisor (Domino’s) in Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Domino’s moved for summary judgment on the issue of vicarious liability, arguing that the franchise agreement created an independent contractor, not master-servant, relationship. The Trial Court denied the Motion, holding there was a genuine issue of material fact for the jury despite all parties agreeing the franchise agreement was unambiguous. At trial, a jury found Domino’s vicariously liable for the negligence of the delivery driver. Domino’s appealed.

Holding

The Superior Court found that the unambiguous franchise agreement required the Trial Court to determine, as a matter of law, whether Domino’s exerted day-to-day control over the franchisee, creating a master-servant relationship and subjecting it to vicarious liability. After thorough review of the franchise agreement, the Superior Court determined the franchise agreement did not create a master-servant relationship. Operating standards and requirements of a franchise agreement are not the type or degree of day-to-day control required to impose vicarious liability. Judge Bowes dissented, stating the majority conducted an improper review and reached the wrong disposition, concluding it was within the jury’s province to determine whether Domino’s was subject to vicarious liability.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.

Madrak v. Blink Fitness
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2260 EDA 2022 (non-precedential)

Decided: October 30, 2023

The Court ruled in favor of Defendant Blink Fitness, affirming the dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims regarding injuries from a malfunctioning rowing machine due to her voluntary acceptance of outlined risks in the membership agreement.

Background

Plaintiff’s claims arose from injuries she alleged were caused by a malfunctioning rowing machine at Blink Fitness. This led her to challenge the validity of the exculpatory clause within her membership agreement, arguing that the defective machine and resulting injuries were not covered by the agreement, rendering the exculpatory clause invalid. She further contended that her use of the equipment did not align with the agreement’s definition of “use”.

Despite Plaintiff’s arguments, the Trial Court upheld the exculpatory clause’s validity. The Court emphasized Madrak’s voluntary assumption of risks outlined in the membership agreement, stating that her claims were precluded by the agreement. The Court’s reasoning relied on the explicit language of the exculpatory clause, which waived liability for injuries stemming from the use of gym equipment, including both functioning and malfunctioning machines.

Holding

The Superior Court maintained that Plaintiff’s voluntary assumption of risks extended to the specific injuries she sustained while using the rowing machine. It asserted that the agreement, including the exculpatory clause, was not unconscionable, did not violate public policy, and did not constitute a contract of adhesion. As a result, the Superior Court affirmed the entry of summary judgment, underscoring that Plaintiff’s claims were precluded by the valid and enforceable exculpatory clause within the membership agreement.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matthew Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

Smith v. CMS West, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 218

Decided: October 30, 2023

Transfer of venue based on forum non conveniens was proper where Plaintiffs’ chosen venue was 300 miles away from the accident location and witnesses expressed that traveling would present hardship.

Background

Plaintiff Larry Smith’s hand was amputated while operating a cement mixer at work in Butler County. He and his wife, Kelly Smith, initiated their negligence and strict liability lawsuit in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas. Defendants, MDIA, StoneMar, and CMS West, jointly filed a Petition to transfer venue for forum non conveniens, seeking transfer to Butler County. As part of the Petition, Defendants included four witness Affidavits explaining that travel from Butler County to Philadelphia County would present monetary and/or medical hardships.

During the pendency of the Petition to transfer, the Trial Court also considered Defendants’ discovery Motion, seeking a Protective Order to prohibit Plaintiffs’ counsel from taking venue-related depositions of a group of witnesses in order to counter the hardships presented by Defendants’ Petition to transfer. The Trial Court denied the Protective Order and allowed Plaintiffs to submit six witness Affidavits. Plaintiffs’ counsel subsequently submitted three venue deposition transcripts and one witness Affidavit. Upon review of the entire record, the Trial Court granted Defendants’ Petition to transfer venue, deciding Philadelphia County was an oppressive and vexatious forum.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the venue transfer. The Court stated the distance between Philadelphia and Butler County, a distance of approximately 300 miles, was not just merely inconvenient, but financially and/or medically oppressive to potential witnesses. Defendants’ venue Affidavits formed a sufficient basis for venue transfer, and Plaintiffs’ subsequent deposition transcripts and Affidavit did not convince the Court that transfer was improper. The Superior Court also found no abuse of discretion or error of law with respect to the scope of discovery authorized by the Trial Court.

Questions about this case can be directed to Briana Vetter at (267) 861-7584 or bvetter@tthlaw.com.

Chappell v. Powell
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 253 WDA 2023

Decided: September 29, 2023

Trial Court erred in application of Lamp v. Heyman where Plaintiff followed Court Orders regarding service of process.

Background

Plaintiff sought damages for injuries sustained in an automobile accident. Plaintiff filed a Complaint 14 days before the running of the statute of limitations. After Plaintiff’s attempts at service were unsuccessful, the Court issued a sua sponte “Alternative Service Order,” giving Plaintiff 45 days to effect service or to file a Motion for alternative service. Plaintiff reinstated the Complaint and filed the Motion for alternative service within the Court’s designated timeframe. The Court issued an Order permitting Plaintiff to effect service by mailing a copy of the Complaint to the Defendant’s insurance company. Plaintiff did so, and was also able to personally serve Defendant. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections to the Complaint, claiming Plaintiff failed to make good faith efforts to serve Defendant. The Trial Court sustained the Preliminary Objections, ruling that Plaintiff’s actions fell short of the requirement of good faith and due diligence.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that she had made good faith efforts to serve the Defendant and reinstated the Complaint several times. The Superior Court noted that the Trial Court cannot authorize alternative service under Rule 430 until there is proof of good faith efforts to effect service. In light of the fact that the Trial Court permitted alternative service, it must have been satisfied that good faith efforts were made. The Superior Court found it confounding that the same jurist who issued the Alternative Service Order and later granted alternative service would ignore the fact that the Plaintiff did exactly what the Court ordered her to do. In reversing the Trial Court, the Superior Court reasoned that because the Trial Court had concluded that Plaintiff made a good faith effort to serve Defendant when issuing the Alternative Service Order, and Plaintiff fully complied with the Orders, the Trial Court erred in sustaining Defendant’s Preliminary Objections.

Holding

The Court reversed the judgment in favor of Defendant and remanded the case to the Trial Court. The Trial Court erroneously applied the Lamp v. Heyman doctrine in finding a lack of good faith effort to serve the Defendant where the same Court previously ruled that a good faith effort had been made.

Questions about this case can be directed to James F. Swartz, III at (610) 332-7028 or jswartz@tthlaw.com.

Kistler v. Dietrich
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 177

Decided: September 22, 2023

Landowners organizing an estate sale near a roadway owed no legal duty to prevent an accident involving a motorcyclist.

Background

Plaintiffs Robert Kistler and his wife, Virginia, appealed from an Order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Michelle M. Dietrich and Kenneth P. Leiby in a negligence and loss of consortium action. The case originated from an accident in which Kistler was injured while riding his motorcycle near the Dietrich property during an estate sale organized by Defendants. Plaintiffs claimed negligence on the part of Defendants for creating hazardous conditions during the estate sale, leading to Kistler’s injuries. The Trial Court granted summary judgment, citing the lack of evidence establishing a duty owed by Defendants to Kistler.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, emphasizing the absence of a legal duty owed by Defendants to Kistler. Plaintiffs argued that Dietrich assumed a duty by directing parking during the estate sale, creating a hazardous condition. However, the court noted that landowners adjacent to roadways do not owe a duty to pedestrians on the roadway. The Court concluded that Defendants did not owe a duty to provide adequate parking or control traffic during the estate sale. Plaintiffs also contended that Defendants voluntarily assumed a duty, citing the Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 323 and 324A. The Court rejected this argument, aligning with Defendants’ position that Plaintiffs were attempting to impose a new legal duty not supported by precedent. Ultimately, the Court held that Plaintiffs failed to establish a legal duty owed by Defendants, leading to the affirming of the summary judgment in favor of Defendants.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matthew Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

Carlino E. Brandywine, L.P. v. Brandywine Vill. Assocs.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 141

Decided: July 28, 2023

Trial Court Order requiring the production of documents containing privileged material affirmed in part, and reversed in part, where the Trial Court erred in finding waiver of attorney-client privilege and attorney work product.

Background

Brandywine Village Associates, LLP (“BVA”) is the owner of an existing shopping center. Carlino East Brandywine, L.P. (“Carlino”) entered into a contract to purchase an adjoining parcel pending approval of its plans to develop the parcel as a shopping center. BVA, John R. Cropper, L&R Partnership, Richard J. Blair, and Leonard G. Blair (collectively “BVA Defendants”), through Paul Prince, Esq., actively opposed Carlino’s efforts to obtain the necessary government approvals for its shopping center. As a result of this opposition, Carlino initiated the underlying action asserting, inter alia, a claim for tortious interference with contract and prospective business relations. After filing an Amended Complaint, the BVA Defendants and Attorney Prince filed a joint Answer and New Matter where BVA Defendants asserted that they acted in good faith reliance on the advice of counsel or in good faith after consulting counsel. Attorney Prince asserted that his actions were good faith advocacy based on his understanding of the law and application of the law to the facts.

In the course of the proceedings, Carlino moved to compel the BVA Defendants and Attorney Prince to produce documents “constituting, referring or relating to all communications and documents exchanged between [BVA Defendants] and/or Attorney Prince” concerning various subjects as well as Attorney Prince’s investigation and analysis of certain issues. The Trial Court ordered production of all attorney-client privileged and attorney work product documents “regarding Defendants’ efforts to prevent and delay the development of [Carlino’s] property.” The BVA Defendants and Attorney Prince appealed to the Superior Court who: (1) affirmed the Trial Court’s ruling that the BVA Defendants waived attorney-client privilege with respect to all communications relevant to their defense based on their reliance on the advice of counsel; (2) held that the Trial Court erred in ordering blanket production of privileged documents without examining the documents to determine whether they were placed in issue by the “advice of counsel” defense; and, (3) held that the BVA Defendants’ “advice of counsel” defense did not constitute a waiver of attorney work product, but did not decide the issue of whether Attorney Prince waived work product protection by asserting that his actions were good faith advocacy. As a consequence the Superior Court remanded the case to the Trial Court directing it to, inter alia, order production of a privilege log.

While the appeal was pending, the Trial Court permitted Carlino to file a Second Amended Complaint, which introduced allegations concerning events subsequent to the First Amended Complaint, added three Defendants, including Attorney Prince’s law firm Prince and Kurtas (“Prince Defendants”), and added several new claims against the Appellants. In their Answers to the Second Amended Complaint, the BVA Defendants this time did not specifically allege reliance on advice of counsel and only pled good faith, and the Prince Defendants pled only that their actions were good faith advocacy. Following the filing of the Answers, the Trial Court carried out the directive to order Appellants to produce a privilege log to which Appellants sought reconsideration in view of their newest Answer and New Matter no longer pleading reliance on advice of counsel. This Motion was denied and following an in camera inspection of the privilege log, the Trial Court held that: (1) the BVA Defendants’ advice of counsel action waived attorney-client privilege as to all documents that were relevant to the underlying action; and (2) Attorney Prince’s assertions in his Answer to the Second Amended Complaint that his actions were good faith advocacy waived the attorney work product protection without considering whether the documents were authored by the Prince Defendants. Accordingly, the Trial Court entered an Order requiring Defendants to produce a number of documents from the privilege log.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed in part requiring the production of certain privilege log documents, and reversed in part with respect to the remaining subject privilege log documents. The Superior Court began by addressing challenges concerning waiver of attorney-client privilege. In its analysis, the Court noted that a party waives attorney-client privilege when it places the attorney’s communications or actions in issue or attempts to prove a defense by reference to privileged material, even when such reliance isn’t specifically pled, if state of mind is a defense and could be based on attorney advice or communications. Such waiver is only as to the privileged material placed in issue. As a consequence, the Court concluded that the BVA Defendants waived attorney-client privilege as to those communications which could have affected their knowledge and intent in taking the actions they claim were in good faith, notwithstanding their exclusion of language regarding reliance on advice of counsel in their Answer and New Matter to the Second Amended Complaint. The Court supported this conclusion by noting that the BVA Defendants did not file anything indicating that they would refrain from arguing or presenting evidence that their good faith was based on advice of counsel. The Superior Court further held that such waiver is not limited to communications with Attorney Prince, as the waiver is related to the defense, not communications with any particular lawyer. From these conclusions, the Superior Court ultimately reversed the Trial Court’s Order to produce privilege log documents containing attorney-client privilege to the extent that it (the Trial Court) had ordered production of communications that: (1) took place after those actions of the BVA Defendants which formed the basis of Carlino’s claims; and (2) only related to pleadings or strategy in this action.

As to attorney work product doctrine, the Court noted that attorney work product is waived by assertion of a claim or defense that places the attorney’s state of mind in issue. The Court concluded that Attorney Prince placed his state of mind in issue when he pled that his actions were good faith advocacy and were based on application of his legal judgment to the facts. Consequently, the Trial Court was affirmed to the extent that it found that Attorney Price waived attorney work product protection. The Court further concluded, however, that Attorney Price did not and could not waive attorney work product protection for other attorneys involved in the underlying matter, as the right to assert such protection belonged to those attorneys. The Court noted that the Trial Court did not find that the other attorneys asserted a defense that would waive their attorney work product protection. In view of the above conclusions, the Court reversed the Trial Court to the extent that it ordered the production of privilege log documents containing attorney work product which was not authored by Attorney Price.

Questions about this case can be directed to Thomas Lopez at (717) 441-7057 or tlopez@tthlaw.com.