eNotes: Liability – February 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Olar v. Bennett
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 282

Decided: December 29, 2023

Evidence presented in automobile accident case failed to establish foundation for a sudden emergency instruction.

Background

Plaintiffs filed suit seeking money damages for serious injuries arising from a pedestrian versus motor vehicle accident. The accident occurred around 11:30 p.m. when Plaintiffs left a birthday party at a Fraternal Order of Owl’s Nest. They were crossing Little Deer Creek Valley Road returning to their car parked in a lot across the road from the Owl’s Nest. The posted speed limit was 25 mph, and the area was lit, with streetlights lining the northbound side of the road, along with ambient light from shops and businesses on the southbound side. Defendant Bennett was driving northbound when he struck Plaintiffs with his minivan as they were crossing the road. Defendant did not see the pedestrians until he hit them. Defendant testified that he was familiar with the area, including the crossing area for the Owl’s Nest parking lot. There was no indication that Plaintiffs darted into traffic, and there was no evidence of any obstruction in the roadway. Defendant was driving with headlights on, and the evidence revealed that, if Defendant was traveling at the speed limit, he would have been 154 feet away when Plaintiffs entered the road.

At the conclusion of trial, over the Plaintiffs’ objections, the Trial Court granted Defendant’s request for a charge on the sudden emergency doctrine and denied Plaintiffs’ request for charges which explained the legal duty of a motorist. The jury found Defendant not negligent and returned a verdict in his favor. Plaintiffs appealed, maintaining that the Trial Court committed reversible error in instructing the jury on sudden emergency.

Holding

The Superior Court concluded that the evidence presented failed to establish a foundation for a sudden emergency instruction, and the trial court committed reversible error. A sudden emergency defense is available to a party who is suddenly and unexpectedly confronted with a perilous situation which permits little or no opportunity to apprehend and react to the situation. Based on the review of the record, the Court found the evidence did not support that Defendant was confronted with a sudden and unforeseeable occurrence. Defendant’s inexplicable failure to see pedestrians crossing the road was not a sudden emergency.

Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.

Early v. Patient First Pa. Med. Grp. PLLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 805 EDA 2023

Decided: December 26, 2023

General release signed in connection with a dog bite incident barred subsequent medical malpractice claim arising out of treatment of dog bite injury.

Background

Donna Early sustained dog bite wounds to her right hand and left index finger and treated for the wounds on the date of the bites with Defendant Patient First. The injuries, however, subsequently worsened. The next day, she sought medical care at a different facility where she was diagnosed with tenosynovitis and septic arthritis of the left index finger, which required surgical intervention, and an infection requiring intravenous antibiotics. At some point thereafter, she settled with the dog owners and their insurer and signed a General Release that included language that for $25,000 she released the dog owners “and any and all other persons, firms, corporations, associations, of and from any and all causes of action . . . known and unknown, which I/we now have or may hereafter have . . . arising from or by reason of any and all bodily or personal injury . . . which heretofore has/have been or which hereafter may be sustained by me/us arising out of the accident on or about September 30, 2018 at or near 38 Woodside Ave . . . .” Early subsequently filed a Complaint against Defendant asserting claims of medical negligence relating to its treatment of her dog bite injuries.

The General Release was eventually disclosed through discovery and prompted Defendant to file a Motion for summary judgment, asserting that the Release barred Early’s claims against it. Early responded with an Affidavit asserting that she was unrepresented when she signed the General Release and only intended to release the dog owners and not her healthcare providers. She also argued that her claim against Defendant had not accrued at the time she signed the Release because she was not aware of the full extent of her injuries resulting from her medical treatment. The Trial Court granted the Motion for summary judgment.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed. The Court confirmed that “a clear, all-inclusive release should not ‘be set aside whenever one of the parties has a change of mind or whenever there subsequently occurs a change of circumstances which were unforeseen, or there were after-discovered injuries, or the magnitude of a releasor’s injuries was unexpectedly increased, or the plaintiff made an inadequate settlement.’” Releases are construed, however, to not bar claims that do not accrue by the date of the execution of the release. Based on this, the Court concluded that it was not error for the Trial Court to grant summary judgment because, in the absence of evidence that Early was unaware of a causal connection between her treatment and her injuries (particularly because they occurred on the same date as the dog bites and before she signed the Release), the broad language of the General Release barred her medical malpractice claims.

Questions about this case can be directed to Julia Morrison at (717) 441-7056 or jmorrison@tthlaw.com.

Erie Ins. Exch. v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 271

Decided: December 21, 2023

The Trial Court’s error in converting Erie Insurance’s promissory estoppel claim to negligent spoliation and dismissing it warranted the reversal of summary judgment in favor of United Services Automobile Association.

Background

Plaintiff Erie Insurance Exchange appealed from an Order granting summary judgment to Defendant United Services Automobile Association in a case involving damages based on promissory estoppel. The dispute arose from a fire at Bates Collision’s automotive repair shop, damaging several vehicles, including a BMW insured by Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant promised to secure, wrap and preserve the BMW for future examination, but failed to do so, leading to its sale at a salvage auction. The Trial Court, however, erroneously recharacterized Plaintiff’s claim as one of negligent spoliation of evidence and dismissed it based on Pennsylvania not recognizing such claims.

Holding

The Superior Court reversed, holding that the Trial Court erred in converting the claim and dismissing it. The Court reasoned that the Trial Court’s reliance on Pyeritz, a case involving negligent spoliation, was misplaced since Plaintiff’s claim was based on promissory estoppel, not asserted in Pyeritz. Additionally, the Court disagreed with the Trial Court’s alternative consideration of Plaintiff’s promissory estoppel claim, arguing that damages were not speculative as alleged by Plaintiff, and that causation was a factual matter inappropriate for summary judgment. The Court reversed the Order, stating that the Trial Court erred in its disposition of Plaintiff’s claim.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matt Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

Brown v. Gaydos
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 258

Decided: December 7, 2023

Summary judgment was improper where there existed unresolved factual disputes pertaining to the Defendant’s roles as both employer and co-employee.

Background

John Brown appealed a summary judgment entered in favor of George Gaydos in a negligence action. The action related to a work injury suffered by Brown while operating a skid loader owned by Gaydos. The Trial Court indicated that Gaydos operated a construction business and, along with his cousin, entered into a partnership agreement to operate under the name American Concrete Solutions (“ACS”). Brown, who worked for ACS, was injured while operating Gaydos’ skid loader. Gaydos claimed immunity from liability under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act, either as Brown’s employer or co-employee. On appeal, the issue was whether the Court erroneously concluded that Gaydos was immune from third-party liability as Brown’s co-employee under the WCA. The record indicated that Brown’s workers’ compensation claim was not disputed, and substantial compensation had been paid by ACS.

Holding

In reversing the summary judgment granted in favor of Gaydos, the Superior Court considered whether Gaydos was immune as Brown’s co-employee under Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court held that there were genuine issues of material fact because Gaydos, as a co-owner of a separate business entity that owned, maintained and insured the equipment involved, loaned the equipment to ACS, and the circumstances surrounding Gaydos’ role, use of the equipment, and instructions to employees created uncertainties that needed resolution through further proceedings. Additionally, the Court found a genuine issue of material fact regarding co-employee immunity, as it was unclear whether Gaydos was acting within “the same employ” as Brown at the time of the accident. The Court remanded the case for further proceedings.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matt Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

Warner v. Cummings
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 463 WDA 2023

Decided: December 1, 2023

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s summary judgment in favor of the Moving Defendants because the Plaintiff failed to identify “evidence creating a genuine question of fact as to whether [Defendants] ‘knew or should have known of their dog’s vicious propensities.’”

Background

Plaintiff Breannah Warner filed suit against Defendants, James Cummings, Gery Lynn Cummings, and Unchained Canines, LLC (a company owned and operated by the Cummings that installs and maintains “invisible fences for the purpose of confining dogs within a designated area”). Plaintiff alleged negligence and vicarious liability for actions stemming “from a dog bite incident.” The Complaint identified Plaintiff as a landscaper, who performed work at the Cummings residence, and suffered “permanent scarring and disfigurement of the face,” as a direct and proximate cause of Defendants’ alleged failure to fix the fence designed to confine the dog and to warn Plaintiff “that the dog may be dangerous.” The Trial Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, finding that “the record lacks any evidence that Defendants knew or should have known of their dog’s vicious propensities.”

Holding

Plaintiff appealed to the Superior asserting that the record otherwise supported Defendants’ knowledge of the dog’s “aggressive nature,” “discomfort during hot summer months,” and “multiple health conditions,” which exacerbated the dog’s dangerous propensities. The Court explained that liability to a dog owner for injuries caused by the dog will only attach if the Defendant knew or had to reason to know “that the animal will display vicious tendencies.” The Court affirmed the Trial Court because Plaintiff “did not cite any expert or objective evidence to support her theories” that the several factors – dog’s breed, summer weather, and health conditions – “caused the dog to have a vicious disposition and bite her on that day.”

Questions about this case can be directed to Javier Zurita at (267) 861-7574 or jzurita@tthlaw.com.