eNotes: Liability – March 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 77 MAP 2022

Decided: January 29, 2024

In this long-awaited decision, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court holds that the “regular use exclusion” in automobile policies is valid and enforceable and not contrary to the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”).

Background

Mr. Rush was working as a detective with the City of Easton and was injured while operating an unmarked police car owned by the City. The vehicle Mr. Rush was operating carried $35,000 in underinsured motorist (“UIM”) benefits. In addition to the coverage on the City vehicle, Mr. Rush and his wife insured two vehicles under two separate household automobile policies with Erie. The first policy provided for stacked UIM benefits for one vehicle in the amount of $250,000 and the second policy provided for stacked UIM benefits of $250,000 for two vehicles.

The Erie policies contained identical “regular use exclusions” in the UIM endorsements which stated that coverage did not apply to “bodily injury to you or a resident using a non-owned motor vehicle, or a non-owned miscellaneous vehicle, which is regularly used by you or a resident, but not insured for uninsured or underinsured coverage under this policy.” After the accident, Mr. Rush collected the BI limits from the tortfeasor as well as the UIM policy limits from the non-owned occupied vehicle. Mr. Rush then looked for additional UIM benefits from his Erie policies; however, Erie denied coverage arguing that Mr. Rush was driving a vehicle he did not own but regularly used which was in violation of the “regular use exclusion.” In contrast to the language in Williams v. Geico and Burstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., both the Trial Court and the Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the exclusions violated the plain language of Section 1731 of the MVFRL. In doing so, the Superior Court attempted to distinguish the language in these prior cases, addressing the validity and enforceability of the exclusion, as mere dicta.

Holding

On appeal, the Supreme Court held that the “regular use exclusion,” as provided for under the UIM endorsement, was valid and enforceable and did not violate Section 1731 of the MVFRL. The Supreme Court reviewed prior precedent, to include Williams and Burstein, which noted that the exclusion was not void as against public policy. The Supreme Court was critical of the Lower Court’s reasoning and determined, based on the language of the MVFRL, that UIM coverage was not “universally portable” as previously argued. Ultimately, the Supreme Court found that “[o]nce it is decided that UIM coverage is not universally portable – given the express non-priority of an insured’s UIM policy coverage in Section 1733 and the contrary priority of coverage for first-party benefits – any argument that Section 1731 prohibits exclusions from coverage in the insurance contract must fail. If the MVFRL does not require that UIM coverage follow the insured in all circumstances, then the MVFRL cannot be read to prohibit exclusions from UIM coverage. Consequently, the insurance contract controls the scope of UIM coverage, and the ‘regular use’ exclusion is enforceable.”

Questions about this case can be directed to John Lucy at (717) 441-7067 or jlucy@tthlaw.com.

Pritchard v. Meintel
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 49 C.D. 2022, 2024 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 13

Decided: January 10, 2024

The real estate exception to sovereign immunity was satisfied where Plaintiff alleged that a Commonwealth agency failed to maintain a non-slip surface of a metal ramp.

Background

Plaintiff, an inmate at SCI-Graterford, filed a Complaint sounding in negligence against Defendant, the facility manager at SCI-Graterford. Plaintiff alleged that he slipped and fell as he walked down a metal ramp covered with water, due to a spill by kitchen staff, causing injury. The metal ramp had slip resistant features, which had deteriorated and had not been replaced/maintained. Defendant filed Preliminary Objections, including a demurrer based on sovereign immunity. The Trial Court sustained the demurrer, holding that the Complaint was barred by sovereign immunity as it did not fall within the real estate exception.

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the real estate exception applied due to Defendant’s failure to maintain the slip resistant material on the ramp. Plaintiff argued that his injuries were caused by the ramp’s defective condition due to the failure to maintain the slip resistant material, not simply because there was water on the ramp. Defendant argued that the Trial Court correctly found the real estate exception inapplicable, as the water on the ramp is not a dangerous condition inherent in the Commonwealth real estate.

Holding

The Commonwealth Court, relying on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s recent decision in Wise v. Huntingdon Cty. Hous. Dev. Corp., 249 A.3d 506, 517 (Pa. 2021), found the facts at issue sufficient to invoke the real estate exception due to a defect in the metal ramp – insufficient slip resistance on the ramp – which had been allowed to deteriorate for years. The Court confirmed that a concurrent cause in addition to a dangerous condition created by Commonwealth real estate (i.e., the water spilled on the ramp) does not foreclose applicability of the real estate exception. The Commonwealth Court held that the Lower Court erred in finding the real estate exception inapplicable. The Court thus reversed and remanded the matter for further review. Per the Commonwealth Court, to the extent the Complaint alleged causes of action solely on Defendant’s negligence, unconnected to the maintenance of the ramp, the Trial Court decision should be affirmed.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.

James v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2024 Pa. Super. 17

Decided: February 2, 2024

Venue transfer pursuant to forum non conveniens doctrine reversed where it was not shown the affected witnesses’ testimony was relevant and necessary to the defense.

Background

Plaintiff Ms. James was working for a contractor at a Walmart distribution center in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania, when she slipped and fell on a slippery substance. She allegedly injured her back and neck, requiring surgery and extensive medical care. She received care for these injuries in Lehigh County. Ms. James later filed negligence actions in Philadelphia County against Walmart, Inc., Walmart Stores East. Walmart.com USA, the Walmart Distribution Center (collectively “Walmart”) and the warehouse manager of the Bethlehem warehouse. After pleadings, Defendants filed a Motion to transfer venue based on forum non conveniens, arguing that the choice of Philadelphia County was oppressive because the case had no connection to Philadelphia County, and litigating in Philadelphia would create hardships for the warehouse manager and other witnesses.

The parties engaged in discovery focused on the venue issue. The warehouse manager and corporate representative of Walmart provided deposition testimony on this issue. This discovery never identified the Defendants’ defenses and the evidence that these two witnesses would provide which were key to the defense, instead focusing on the hardship of travel for these two individuals. The Trial Court held a hearing on February 27, 2023, and entered an Order granting the Motion to transfer based upon forum non conveniens. The Trial Court transferred the matter to Lehigh County. Ms. James appealed this decision, raising issues of whether the Trial Court committed error and abuse of law and an abuse of discretion when it granted the Motion to transfer on incorrect legal standards. Plaintiff argued that the Motion was granted when the witnesses would experience only a 64 mile travel and slight schedule inconvenience.

Holding

The Superior Court reversed the Trial Court and returned the case to Philadelphia County. The Superior Court identified that as a threshold matter, a defendant requesting to transfer venue pursuant to forum non conveniens must identify its defense, the witnesses who would be inconvenienced by traveling for trial, and the relevancy of those witnesses’ testimony to the defendant’s defense. The Court then found that Defendants never even identified whether the two witnesses in question would testify at trial, let alone how their testimony would further the Defendants’ position. The Court then held that without information as to the importance of the trial testimony of the two witnesses in question, the Trial Court erred in assuming that they were key witnesses when evaluating the hardships of their travel for a Philadelphia trial. Therefore, the Superior Court reversed the Trial Court’s transfer of venue.

Questions about this case can be directed to Logan Nagle at (717) 255-7234 or lnagle@tthlaw.com.

N.T. v. Children’s Hosp. of Phila.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2024 Pa. Super. 14

Decided: January 25, 2024

Judicial estoppel bars litigant from “playing fast and loose” with the judicial system in attempt to recover under irreconcilably inconsistent position than earlier maintained.

Background

N.T. (“Minor”), by her guardian, filed several lawsuits seeking damages for the same injuries she suffered in utero prior to her birth. While Minor’s mother (“Mother”) was pregnant with Minor and her twin sister, she (Mother) was diagnosed with twin-to-twin transfusion syndrome (“TTTS”), a condition that jeopardized the survival of both fetuses. Mother was referred to the Children’s Hospital of Philadelphia (“CHOP”) for possible selective laser photocoagulation of communicating vessels treatment (“SLPCV”). The CHOP Defendants concluded that Mother was not a candidate for SLPCV and did not perform the procedure. Mother then went to an Ohio physician, Dr. Crombleholme, who performed the SLPCV procedure. Minor was born with severe neurological deficiencies and her twin was born healthy. Minor filed suit in Ohio against Dr. Cromblesholme alleging that her injuries were caused by Dr. Cromblesholm’s negligence in performing the SLPCV. She also filed a suit in Philadelphia County against CHOP for the same injuries, alleging CHOP was liable for misdiagnosing the condition of the fetuses and for negligently failing to treat the TTTS. The Ohio action went to trial at which Minor’s medical expert testified that Dr. Crombleholme caused Minor’s injuries by firing the laser at healthy placenta tissue during the SLPCV, and that Minor’s injuries were caused by hypoxic injury from the placental damage and not by TTTS. The expert testified that Minor’s brain was normal, and she would have had normal development but for the negligence of the doctor. Minor’s claims against the Ohio Defendants settled for $7 million.

Following settlement of the Ohio action, the CHOP Defendants filed Motions to dismiss all claims against them on the ground that Minor’s claims were barred by judicial estoppel. Judicial estoppel is an equitable doctrine designed to protect the integrity of the courts by “preventing litigants from ‘playing fast and loose’ with the judicial system by adopting whatever position suits the moment.” The Trial Court granted the Motion.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed. The Court confirmed that judicial estoppel bars a party from asserting a position in litigation that is inconsistent with a position the party previously successfully maintained with respect to the same legal and factual issue. It found that the position taken in the Ohio matter – that the Minor suffered no brain damage from TTTS and that the sole cause of her damage was the faulty SLPCV procedure – was inconsistent with and incompatible with the liability theory asserted against the CHOP Defendants – that the untreated TTTS was the cause of minor’s brain damage. Given that Minor’s settlement constituted successful maintenance of a prior litigation, at which an inconsistent position was maintained, judicial estoppel barred the second action.

Questions about this case can be directed to Julia Morrison at (717) 441-7056 or jmorrison@tthlaw.com.

Mason v. Ne. Architectural Prods.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 735 MDA 2023

Decided: December 21, 2023

Summary judgment was proper under the “borrowed employee” doctrine due to manufacturing plant’s right to control the employee’s work.

Background

Plaintiff, Anthony Mason, appealed an Order by the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas entering summary judgment in favor of Northeast Architectural Products d/b/a Daron Northeast (“Daron”) in this negligence action seeking damages for a work-related injury. This matter concerns a work-related injury suffered by Plaintiff while working at Daron’s manufacturing plant. A month prior to Plaintiff’s injuries, Plaintiff visited with a temporary employment agency (“Express”), where he was informed of an open position at Daron’s plant and told to report there the next morning. Express also explained to Plaintiff the basic responsibilities and duties of the job.

Once Plaintiff arrived at Daron’s plant, he was given a tour of the facilities, provided with safety equipment and given a “brief” discussion regarding his job responsibilities, all by a Daron supervisor. However, Express paid the Plaintiff’s salary and had the sole authority to hire/fire Plaintiff. Additionally, Plaintiff testified that much of his on-the-job training was conducted by “other Express employees” who were working at Daron’s plant. Further, it was undisputed that representatives of Express would visit Daron’s facilities. Based on these facts, Plaintiff claimed the Trial Court improperly determined he was a “borrowed employee” and thus, the Trial Court’s entry of summary judgment in favor of Daron was improper.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, upholding its entry of summary judgment to Daron based on the fact that Plaintiff was a “borrowed employee” at the time of his accident, meaning Daron was immune from liability under the exclusivity provisions of Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act. The Court held that the relevant test for whether an individual is a “borrowed employee” is “whether Defendant had the right to direct and control Plaintiff’s work and the manner of its performance . . . .” The Court noted that Daron met this test as there was nothing which indicated Express did anything other than instructing Plaintiff to show up at Daron at a specific time and paying Plaintiff’s salary, which the Court noted was not a dispositive factor. Additionally, while Express representatives did visit Daron’s facility roughly once or twice a year, “it was more in the nature of a ‘sales call.’” Further, while the employees who Plaintiff claimed trained him and directed his work were also placed at Daron by Express, the Court held that these employees were training Plaintiff in their capacity as employees of Daron, not Express – a decision consistent with past precedent. Considering the foregoing, the Court held that the Plaintiff was a “borrowed employee” and was unable to pursue a negligence action against Daron pursuant to the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act.

Questions about this case can be directed to Nathan Coffing at (267) 861-7586 or ncoffing@tthlaw.com.