eNotes: Liability – May 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Hangey v. Husqvarna Prof’l Prods., Inc.
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 14 EAP 2022

Decided: November 22, 2023

Lawsuit against lawnmower manufacturer was properly venued in Philadelphia County where company had authorized dealer in Philadelphia who did regular business there.

Background

This case arises out of a lawnmower accident. Ronald Hangey purchased a Husqvarna riding lawnmower from an authorized dealer in Bucks County. While using the mower at his Wayne County property, the mower rolled. The mower blades did not stop, causing severe injuries to both Mr. Hangey’s legs. He sued Husqvarna and the authorized dealer in Philadelphia County. Both Defendants argued that they did not conduct regular business in Philadelphia County. Husqvarna’s sales in Philadelphia County accounted for only about .005% of its national sales. On Preliminary Objections as to venue, the Trial Court ruled in favor of the Defendants and transferred venue to Bucks County on the basis of de minimis contacts with Philadelphia. Mr. Hangey appealed to the Superior Court, which overturned the venue transfer. Husqvarna and their authorized dealer appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted allocatur.

Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s ruling. The Court ruled that venue was appropriate in Philadelphia County. The Trial Court erred in focusing only on the quantity of contacts Husqvarna had with Philadelphia County. While Husqvarna’s sales in Philadelphia were only .005% of their national sales, it did have an authorized dealer in Philadelphia, which accounted for almost all of its Philadelphia sales. As a result, despite not having a direct presence in Philadelphia, or much in the way of sales, Husqvarna was still found to regularly conduct business in Philadelphia, such that venue was proper. The majority opinion reminded trial courts that an analysis of both the quantity and quality of contacts with a county is necessary to determine propriety of a venue.

Questions about this case can be directed to William Novick at (610) 332-7029 or wnovick@tthlaw.com.

Pinckney v. Taylor
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 617 EDA 2023

Decided: March 15, 2024

In this unpublished decision, the Superior Court reiterated that electronic signatures are as valid and binding as handwritten signatures, finding that Plaintiffs were bound by the limited tort election.

Background

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint alleging bodily injury arising out of a rear-end car accident. In the New Matter, Defendant alleged that Plaintiffs’ claims were limited or barred based on their tort status, which Plaintiffs denied in their Reply to New Mater. At trial, Plaintiffs filed a Motion in limine arguing that Defendant failed to carry his burden of proof on the limited tort issue. Plaintiffs acknowledged that Plaintiff Pinckney testified at her deposition that she had limited tort coverage, but also that she could not recall all of her insurance policy provisions. Plaintiffs argued that the subpoenaed documents from Plaintiffs’ insurer, including a tort election electronically signed by Plaintiff Pinckney, was inadmissible hearsay and not properly authenticated.

The Trial Court ruled in Defendant’s favor, finding Plaintiffs were bound by limited tort. The trial proceeded, and the jury found Plaintiffs had not suffered serious injury, awarding $250.00 each. Plaintiffs filed a Post-Trial Motion, which was denied and judgment was entered for Defendant. Plaintiffs then filed this appeal.

Plaintiffs argued that the limited tort defense was an affirmative defense upon which Defendant bore the burden of proof at trial; the Trial Court improperly shifted the burden to Plaintiffs to prove they were not bound by limited tort; the tort election form was not authenticated and should not have been considered; and Plaintiff Pinckney’s deposition testimony regarding her tort election was not part of the record. Even if the Trial Court could have properly considered Plaintiff Pinckney’s deposition testimony, Plaintiffs argued that Plaintiff Pinckney did not unequivocally testify that she was limited tort. Further, even if she had testified as such, her knowledge of her tort status is not sufficient to prove that Plaintiff Pinckney signed the form herself and elected limited tort coverage. Plaintiffs argued that without admissible evidence that Plaintiff Pinckey elected limited tort, the Trial Court should have considered her to have full tort.

Holding

The Superior Court, reviewing the Trial Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion, affirmed the Trial Court’s Order denying Plaintiffs’ Motion in Limine. The Superior Court reiterated that in Pennsylvania, electronic signatures are as admissible and enforceable as handwritten signatures. The Superior Court found that the form was properly authenticated, as it was undisputedly obtained directly from Plaintiffs’ insurer via subpoena. The form bears what appears to be Plaintiff Pinckney’s signature, and Plaintiff Pinckney testified that her policy was limited tort. Such circumstantial evidence was sufficient to authenticate the form and support the Trial Court’s finding that limited tort coverage applied to Plaintiffs.

The Superior Court further found that burden of proof was not improperly shifted to Plaintiffs, as instructing the parties to initiate motions practice is not equivalent to placing the burden of proof on them. Plaintiffs’ argument that the Trial Court improperly considered Plaintiff Pinckney’s deposition testimony was likewise rejected by the Superior Court as Plaintiffs quoted the testimony in their Motion in Limine and did not dispute its accuracy. Lastly, Plaintiffs waived their argument that the trial court should have held an evidentiary hearing, as they failed to request one below.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.

Kent v. Williams
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1855 EDA 2023

Decided: February 13, 2024

Plaintiff may prove damages without a medical expert where cause of the injury is clear and subject matter within common experience and understanding of lay jurors.

Background

Plaintiff William Kent appealed from a compulsory nonsuit entered against him prior to the commencement of trial. Plaintiff Kent filed suit against Defendant Darryl Williams for personal injuries arising out of a fifteen-foot fall from a ladder.

Prior to trial, the Lower Court ruled that Kent’s medical records were inadmissible without testimony from a records’ custodian or a medical expert witness. Thereafter, on the day of trial, the Court ruled that Plaintiff Kent’s medical expert could not testify because the expert was not identified in the Pre-Trial Memorandum and, without any Motion pending, the Lower Court entered nonsuit against Plaintiff Kent concluding that he could not establish his cause of action.

Holding

The Appellate Court noted that a personal injury plaintiff is competent to testify to his own pain and suffering. In a personal injury case, where “the cause of the injury is clear and the subject matter is within the common experience and understanding of lay jurors, expert testimony is not required.” Expert medical testimony is required only “when there is no obvious causal relationship between the accident and the injury.” Plaintiff Kent alleged he fell approximately 15 feet from a ladder and struck the pavement, suffering immediate injuries. That said, Kent averred an obvious causal relationship between the accident and the injury, and the subject matter was within the common experience and understanding of lay jurors. Accordingly, the Court concluded that no medical expert was required, and Kent’s own testimony would be sufficient to establish damages. Therefore, the Appellate Court reversed the Trial Court’s nonsuit and remanded for trial.

Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.