eNotes: Liability – August 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Turner v Lower Merion Sch. Dist.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
2024 Pa. Commw. LEXIS 119

Decided: May 10, 2024

Item temporarily affixed to real property did not qualify as exception to school district’s immunity.

Background

A high school student was participating in gym class when he was injured during a kickball game. The game utilized bases that were not affixed to the ground and, while running, a base slid out from underneath the student, leading to his injury. The school district filed a Motion for judgment on the pleadings contending that it was immune from liability under Pennsylvania statute. The Motion was granted and the Plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the issue fell within the real property exception to the school district’s immunity.

Holding

The Commonwealth Court found that the negligence claim did not fall within the real property exception to governmental immunity as the injury was caused by personalty rather than real property, as the bases were used for a temporary purpose and were not a part of the property. Accordingly, the Commonwealth Court affirmed the Order of dismissal and held that the school district was entitled to governmental immunity.

Questions about this case can be directed to Brook Dirlam at (412) 926-1438 or bdirlam@tthlaw.com.

Jones v. Erie Ins. Exch.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 690 WDA 2020

Decided: July 3, 2024

Superior Court affirms judgment for UIM auto insurer where the regular use exclusion does not violate the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Background

Mr. Jones was operating his employer’s bucket truck when he was involved in an accident with a third-party driver. Mr. Jones suffered various injuries and received a policy limits payout from the third-party driver’s insurance. Mr. and Mrs. Jones then filed a supplemental claim for underinsured motorist (“UIM”) coverage from Erie, their own auto insurance provider, claiming Mr. Jones’ injuries and damages exceeded the third-party policy limits. Erie denied the Jones’ claim pursuant to the “regularly used, non-owned vehicle exclusion,” also known as the regular use exclusion, because the vehicle Mr. Jones was operating belonged to his employer and Jones had not purchased insurance for it. Mr. and Mrs. Jones filed a Complaint against Erie alleging one count of breach of contract. Erie filed an Answer with New Matter and Counterclaim, then soon after filed for judgment on the pleadings.

Erie alleged in their Motion that the Plaintiffs’ claim was barred by the regular use exclusion. The Plaintiffs opposed, arguing the regular use exclusion was unenforceable as contrary to the motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”) and public policy. The Trial Court held a hearing and then granted Erie’s Motion, ordering judgment in its favor. The Superior Court initially reversed the Trial Court, but the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated the Superior Court’s decision and remanded the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings consistent with Rush v. Erie Ins. Exch., 308 A.3d 780 (Jan. 29, 2024) (holding that regular use exclusion is a permissible limitation of UIM coverage under the MVFRL).

Holding

The Superior Court on remand affirmed the Trial Court’s decision granting judgment in favor of Erie. The Court found the holding of the Supreme Court in Rush was unambiguously clear that regular use exclusions do not violate the MVFRL. Accordingly, the judgment of the Trial Court was proper, and judgment on the pleadings in Erie’s favor was appropriate.

Questions about this case can be directed to Logan Nagle at (717) 255-7234 or lnagle@tthlaw.com.

Van Horn v. Giant Co.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2149 EDA 2023

Decided: July 3, 2024

Superior Court affirms forum non conveniens transfer from Philadelphia County to Montgomery County.

Background

Plaintiff Van Horn sustained injuries as a result of a slip and fall that occurred at a Giant grocery store in Montgomery Township, Montgomery County, PA. Subsequently, she brought a negligence action against Defendant, The Giant Co., in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County. Defendant Giant filed a Motion to transfer venue to Montgomery County, invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Defendant Giant attached sworn Affidavits from two Giant employees, setting forth the distance they would have to travel and a general statement as to their anticipated testimony. The Trial Court granted Defendant Giant’s Motion and transferred the action to the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County. On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Trial Court abused its discretion in transferring the action to Montgomery County because Defendant Giant failed to show that litigating this case in Philadelphia County would be oppressive or vexatious, not merely inconvenient.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision to transfer the action to Montgomery County. The Superior Court emphasized that the two witnesses – one of whom was an eyewitness to the fall – would each have to travel approximately three hours with rush hour traffic if the trial was in Philadelphia County. The Superior Court held that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion because it considered relevant factors including: Plaintiff’s failure to appear at the initial hearing to contest Defendant’s Motion to transfer, Plaintiff’s residency in Mongomery County, Plaintiff’s alleged fall occurring in Montgomery County, Defendant’s allegedly negligent conduct occurring in Montgomery County, and the fact that none of the witnesses resided in Philadelphia County. The Court further indicated that “Philadelphia taxpayers, courts, and juries should not have to sustain all of the slip and fall litigation for Wawa, Giant, Acme and other regional supermarkets” simply because these chains may operate stores in Philadelphia County. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision.

Questions about this case can be directed to Adam G. Kleiber at (717) 237-7157 or akleiber@tthlaw.com.

SpiriTrust Lutheran v. Wagman Constr., Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 572 MDA 2022

Decided: April 23, 2024

Pennsylvania Superior Court finds Plaintiff’s negligence claims were barred by the gist of the action doctrine.

Background

In this construction defect case, SpiriTrust Lutheran (“SpiriTrust”) alleged that in 2007, Wagman Construction, Inc. (“Wagman”) negligently, and in breach of contractual duties, built defective retaining walls and other structures on its property. It was alleged that in 2019, years after completion of the site work, a wall collapsed, leading to the relocation of various residents. Wagman responded that SpiriTrust’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations, the gist of the action doctrine, and the economic loss doctrine. It argued that Plaintiff’s negligence claim was barred because it was duplicative of the breach of contract claims and rooted solely in Wagman’s contractual duties. It also argued that the negligence count was legally deficient because the asserted damages were all purely economic losses and therefore not recoverable in tort. The Trial Court sustained Wagman’s Preliminary Objections and granted judgment on the pleadings in its favor. SpiriTrust appealed.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court reasoned that the gist of the alleged duty in the breach of contract counts was that Wagman had a duty to design and construct the retaining walls “in a reasonable workmanlike manner and in accordance with industry standards.” The gist of the alleged duty in the negligence count was that Wagman had to design and construct the retaining walls in accordance with “accepted engineering standards and industry practice.” The Court found that there appeared to be no material difference between “industry standards” and “industry practice.” The Court thus found that the duty described in the negligence count arose from Wagman’s contractual obligation to provide engineering services. Accordingly, the Superior Court found that the Trial Court did not err in sustaining Wagman’s Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s negligence count, as the duty described in the negligence count was duplicative of, and not in addition to, the duties already imposed by the parties’ contracts. Having found that the Trial Court did not err in applying the gist of the action doctrine as to the negligence count, the Superior Court found it unnecessary to separately address whether the economic loss doctrine was also applicable.

Questions about this case can be directed Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.