eNotes: Liability – September 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Brown-Boyd v. SEPTA
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 1167 C.D. 2022

Decided: July 15, 2024

Bus driver was “operating” a public bus, such that sovereign immunity did not apply, when she stopped the bus to allow decedent to exit, but allegedly failed to lower the handicap ramp.

Background

Plaintiff-decedent, Brenda Watts, allegedly suffered injuries while attempting to exit a public bus that SEPTA bus driver Sharon Gonzales was driving. At the time of the incident, Ms. Watts was sixty-seven (67) years old and suffering from multiple myeloma, a form of cancer that weakened her bones and left her susceptible to fractures with very minimal trauma. When Watts entered the bus, she used a walker and when she decided to exit the bus several minutes later, she asked Gonzales to lower the handicap ramp. Gonzales allegedly refused, compelling Watts to exit by placing her walker outside the buss door and stepping down. When Watts attempted to step down with her right leg, her left leg twisted, resulting in a fracture to her left femur. In addition, Watts used her arms to support her weight to step off the bus, resulting in a fracture to her left humerus.

Watts filed a Complaint against SEPTA. She acknowledged that sovereign immunity generally protected SEPTA from suit but argued that this case fell within the vehicle exception at 42 Pa.C.S. § 8522(b)(1), which applies to negligent acts involving “[t]he operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or control of a Commonwealth party”.

SEPTA filed a Motion for summary judgment, asserting sovereign immunity. The Trial Court denied SEPTA’s Motion. In its Opinion, the Trial Court concluded that Brown-Boyd’s negligence claim involved the “operation” of a vehicle under § 8522(b)(1).

Holding

On appeal, SEPTA argued, among other issues, that the Trial Court misinterpreted the term “operation” in Section 8522(b)(1). The Commonwealth Court, however, could discern no meaningful distinction between the negligent failures to act the Supreme Court listed in prior precedent, like failing to use lights or turn signals, and the alleged failure to lower the handicap ramp in this case. For these reasons, the Commonwealth Court rejected SEPTA’s argument that failure to engage attachments, such as a handicap ramp, cannot constitute the “operation” of a public bus.

Questions about this case can be directed Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.

Baclit v. Sloan
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2024 Pa. Super. 182

Decided: August 16, 2024

Superior Court addresses availability of stacked UIM benefits and whether injured party was an “insured” under policy.

Background

Sloan experienced a single car accident when his vehicle crashed into a bridge retaining wall. Baclit was driving an automobile owned by his mother (“Hagwood”), when Baclit exited the vehicle to provide aid. Baclit fell from the retaining wall while assisting and sustained fatal injuries. Sloan maintained automobile insurance through Farmers Insurance, and they tendered the limits of the policy to the administrator of Baclit’s estate. Hagwood’s vehicle was insured under a policy from State Farm and provided stacked underinsured motorist coverage (“UIM”) limits of $300,000. State Farm also paid the limits of their policy, as Sloan’s policy was insufficient to cover the damages sustained by Baclit. Baclit also had a motorcycle policy through Progressive which included $15,000 in UIM coverage. The estate received the limits of this policy as well.

Baclit was the president and sole officer of TKC Trucking. TKC had a commercial automobile insurance policy through United Financial Casualty Company (“United”) designating Baclit as a rated driver. The policy covered a 2008 GMC Sierra and a trailer. The United policy provided $100,000 of stacked UIM coverage for the Sierra. The estate requested payment of UIM benefits from United under the TKC policy and United denied, stating the policy did not provide coverage because Baclit was operating a non-insured vehicle and therefore did not meet the definition of an “insured.” The estate then filed suit against United, Sloan, and others. The estate asserted claims of breach of contract, bad faith, wrongful death, and survival. The estate was granted summary judgment on the claims for breach of contract. United appealed, asserting Baclit was not an insured by the plain language of the policy, and the only named insured was TKC Trucking.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed that Baclit was an insured under the policy and entitled to receive stacked UIM benefits under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. Baclit’s estate properly tried to recover UIM benefits, Baclit never signed any stacking waiver forms, and TKC through Baclit paid an increased premium for stacking. The Court found that Baclit was the intended recipient of any benefits as the sole officer of the business. The Court held that the Trial Court’s finding of undisputed facts was proper and that as the sole officer of TKC and sole payor of the premium, Baclit was a “class-one” insured to any benefits under TKC’s property. The Superior Court held that under these compelling facts, finding Baclit was not a named insured of the policy would render its stacking benefits illusory, and would violate the MVFRL.

Questions about this case can be directed to Logan Nagle at (717) 255-7234 or lnagle@tthlaw.com.

Wandell v. Robert Packer Hosp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1532 MDA 2023

Decided: August 7, 2024

Court addresses the corporate negligence doctrine and the importance of expert testimony in malpractice claim against hospital.

Background

Plaintiff Marcia Wandell alleged she was injured, after surgery, when a bedside commode at Robert Packer Hospital broke causing her to fall and sustain serious injuries. She claimed that her assigned nurse breached the standard of care. She also alleged two claims against Robert Packer – a corporate negligence claim for failing to provide proper care and supervision, and a vicarious liability claim for the negligence of the hospital’s employee. Robert Packer filed a Motion for Summary Judgment that Wandell’s claims required expert testimony to establish a breach of the appropriate standard of care. Wandell argued that the negligence was obvious and did not require expert testimony.

The Trial Court found that expert testimony was essential to establish the standard of care for a patient, such as Wandell, as a layperson would not be able to determine the appropriate level of care required of a health care worker when assisting a patient using the bedside commode after surgery. Since Wandell produced no such expert reports, the Trial Court granted summary judgement in favor of Robert Packer.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. The Court explained that Robert Packer’s actions and/or omissions must be measured against what a reasonable hospital under similar circumstances should have done. Expert testimony was required to opine regarding bedside commode inspection and maintenance standards. That inquiry was not so obvious as to obviate the need for expert testimony.

Questions about this case can be directed to Jhanvi Jamindar at (717) 441-7056 or jjamindar@tthlaw.com.

Knoblich v. Erie Ins. Exch.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2282 EDA 2023

Decided: August 5, 2024

Superior Court affirms carrier had no duty to defend an insured on a faulty workmanship claim.

Background

Plaintiffs Knobliches entered into a contract with M&M HVAC for the installation of a Direct Exchange (“DX”) geothermal heating and cooling system in their home. This system was manufactured by EarthLinked Technologies. Erie insures M&M pursuant to a contractor’s general liability policy. Three months after installation, the Knobliches claimed that the system was not functioning properly. M&M attempted to adjust the air flows but was unsuccessful. EarthLinked was also unsuccessful in addressing the issues with the system. The Knobliches then hired a professional air balance expert who diagnosed the heating/cooling problem and subsequently hired a new HVAC contractor to replace the majority of the DX system.

The Knobliches filed an action against M&M and EarthLinked seeking damages for alleged breach of contract, negligent entrustment, violations of the Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCPL”), and fraudulent inducement. Erie issued a denial of coverage letter stating it had no duty to defend M&M because there was no “occurrence” to trigger the CGL policy. The Knobliches then filed a declaratory judgment action against Erie and M&M, seeking declaration that Erie had a duty to defend M&M in the underlying action. Erie countered seeking a declaration that it had no duty to defend. Erie filed a Motion for summary judgment on its claim. The Trial Court granted Erie’s Motion and entered a declaratory judgment in Erie’s favor, stating that the damage to the Knobliches’ home was due to faulty workmanship, not an accident that would require coverage.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision that there was no triggering occurrence under the Erie policy to require it to defend or indemnify M&M in the underlying suit. The policy itself states that an “occurrence” is “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions.” “Accident” is not defined in the policy, but the Court used Pennsylvania Supreme Court precedent to determine that under the facts here, there was no triggering occurrence, but rather the defective work performed by M&M caused the heating problems.

Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.

Provenzano v. Bartusiak
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 829 WDA 2023

Decided: July 23, 2024

In this unpublished decision, the Superior Court held that a plaintiff tolls the statute of limitations for all claims arising out of the operative facts pled in a magisterial complaint, regardless of the claims’ inclusion in the magisterial complaint.

Background

In summer 2017, Plaintiff patient sought treatment with Defendant dentist to replace dental implants. On August 4, 2017, Plaintiff patient signed a “treatment” document and paid Defendant dentist a deposit of $12,937. On August 7, 2017, Defendant dentist replaced Plaintiff patient’s dental implants. Plaintiff patient returned to Defendant dentist multiple times in August 2017 with complaints of pain. Plaintiff patient ultimately had the implants removed by an oral surgeon in early September 2017.

On August 6, 2019, Plaintiff patient filed a Civil Complaint in the Magisterial District Court seeking the return of $12,000 she paid in advance for dental work that was not performed by Defendant dentist. Plaintiff patient stated in her Complaint that the action was not for malpractice. After a hearing, the Magistrate found for Plaintiff patient and awarded $12,000. Defendant dentist timely appealed to the Court of Common Pleas for a trial de novo and ruled for Plaintiff patient to file a Complaint.

In Plaintiff patient’s Complaint, she asserted a single cause of action for professional negligence and did not include her original contract claim. Defendant dentist filed Preliminary Objections arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiff patient’s action was barred by the 2-year statute of limitations for negligence claims. Plaintiff patient then filed Preliminary Objections to Defendant dentist’s Preliminary Objections. The Trial Court overruled Defendant dentist’s statute of limitations Preliminary Objection. Defendant dentist re-raised the statute of limitations defense in a Motion for judgment on the pleadings and a Motion for summary judgment. After denial of Defendant dentist’s Motion for summary judgment, the Defendant dentist moved for the Trial Court to certify the issue for immediate appeal, which was granted. On appeal, Defendant dentist again raised the statute of limitations as a bar to Plaintiff patient’s professional negligence action. Defendant dentist argues that the Trial Court erred in concluding that the statute of limitations was tolled by Plaintiff patient’s filing of the Magisterial Complaint for relief on only a contract claim.

Holding

The Superior Court, reviewing the Trial Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion or error of law, affirmed the Trial Court’s Order denying Defendant dentist’s Motion for summary judgment. Under Pa.R.Civ.P.D.M.J. 1007, Plaintiff patient was not limited with regard to any of the particulars of the action before the Magisterial District Judge – including joinder of causes of action. The purpose of an appeal de novo is to give a litigant a new trial without reference to the minor court’s record – not for the common pleas court to sit as an appellate court.

The Superior Court found that Plaintiff patient had commenced her Magisterial Complaint within the statute of limitations for both a breach of contract action (4 years) and a negligence action (2 years). Further, the facts contained in Plaintiff patient’s Magisterial Complaint sufficiently placed Defendant dentist on notice for purposes of a negligence action. The Superior Court concluded that any cause of action that a plaintiff could have timely brought at the time they filed a complaint before the magistrate, based upon the same operative facts alleged in the magisterial complaint, tolls the statute of limitations for purposes of alleging a cause of action for the first time on appeal for a trial de novo in the court of common pleas.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.

O’Brien v. Herzog
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1594 EDA 2023

Decided: July 15, 2024

Dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint based on improper service was proper where Plaintiff failed to show a good faith effort to serve Defendants.

Background

Plaintiff John J. O’Brien initiated the underlying action by filing a Praecipe for Writ of Summons in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on September 30, 2020. Notably, the statute of limitations for Plaintiff’s contract action expired on October 7, 2020. In three attempts within a two-week period in October 2020, Plaintiff attempted, but never successfully, served Defendants at their home address in Maryland. Plaintiff did not reinstate the Writ after ninety days pursuant to Pa.R.Civ.P. 404, which requires out-of-state service by a competent adult within ninety days of issuance. More than two years later, Plaintiff filed his Complaint on March 6, 2023, and served it via certified mail upon Defendants on March 13, 2023.

Defendants filed Preliminary Objections to Plaintiff’s Complaint for failure to properly serve the Writ of Summons. The Trial Court sustained the Preliminary Objections, dismissing Plaintiff’s Complaint. On June 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of direct appeal with the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, arguing he made a good faith attempt to serve Defendants.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Per the Court, a plaintiff must provide a defendant with timely notice of the legal action. Instantly, the record evinced no effort by Plaintiff to ascertain why his attempt was unsuccessful, nor did Plaintiff engage in the process of reissuing the Writ after 90 days had expired so he could maintain the vitality of the Writ and continue efforts to effectuate service. Instead, Plaintiff allowed the docket to remain inactive for over two years in the post-limitations period, before he filed a Complaint and served it upon Defendants at the same address. Plaintiff failed to demonstrate requisite good faith effort to diligently and timely serve process.

Questions about this case can be directed to Briana Vetter at (267) 861-7584 or bvetter@tthlaw.com.