eNotes: Liability – August 2022 – Federal

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

FEDERAL CASE SUMMARIES

Lehmann v. Louisville Ladder, Inc.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No. 21-4626, __F. Supp.3d__

Decided: July 6, 2022

Pennsylvania Federal District Court holds that a product’s compliance with government and industry standards is admissible in a strict liability design defect trial where plaintiff attacks that design on a risk/utility basis.

Background

Plaintiff Lehmann sued Louisville Ladder for injuries sustained while using a mobile scaffold which it designed and manufactured. As the case approached trial, the parties filed various Motions in limine seeking to preclude certain trial evidence. Among the evidence that Plaintiff sought excluded was the scaffold’s compliance with industry standards. Plaintiff argued that said evidence was barred by the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s recent decision in Sullivan v. Werner Co., 253 A.3d 730 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2021), wherein that Court held that evidence of a product’s compliance with industry and government standards was inadmissible. The Sullivan case is currently on appeal to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Defendant Louisville Ladder argued that evidence of industry standards is permitted by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Tincher v. Omega Flex, Inc., 104 A.3d 328 (Pa. 2014).

Holding

The Court held that, after Tincher, evidence of a product design’s compliance with government and industry standards is admissible in a strict liability design defect trial where Plaintiff attacks that design on a risk/utility basis. A product fails the risk-utility test if “a reasonable person would conclude that the probability and seriousness of harm caused by the product outweigh the burden or costs of taking precautions.” In adopting the risk utility test, the Tincher Court relied on an Illinois Supreme Court case which held that a product’s conformance with design standards of the industry is relevant to the risk utility test. The prior rule in Pennsylvania excluding compliance evidence was based on an idiosyncratic defect theory that Pennsylvania abandoned in Tincher. Since exclusion of negligence evidence was the sole basis of the prior exclusionary rule, and since Tincher confirms that risk/utility balancing as a defect theory overlaps with negligence, the exclusionary rule has no continuing force. As such, contrary post-Tincher Pennsylvania state court precedent is unpersuasive and incorrect.

Herein, the Court predicted that under Tincher, Pennsylvania law will now admit evidence of standards compliance evidence in strict liability risk/utility design defect cases. It was the Court’s opinion that the Sullivan case, on which Plaintiff relied, was wrongly decided. While industry standards are not dispositive of defect, their independent relevance means the defendant need not wait for the plaintiff to open the door. As such, the Court allowed Louisville Ladder to introduce evidence of industry standards, which was in the form of a competitor products survey that analyzed other manufacturers’ scaffolds similar to the one at issue.

Questions about this case can be directed to Kenneth T. Newman at (412) 926-1425 or knewman@tthlaw.com.

Testa v. Broomall Operating Co.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No. 21-cv-05148

Decided: May 26, 2022

Joinder of individual Defendants in Federal Court was impermissible when done to defeat diversity jurisdiction.

Background

Plaintiff’s estate initiated a lawsuit in state court against the owners of a nursing home facility as a result of Plaintiff’s death. Subsequently, the owners, who were out of state entities, removed the underlying action to Federal Court arguing, among other matter, that the Federal Court had diversity jurisdiction over the matter and additionally moved to dismiss the Complaint. In response to the owners’ Motion to dismiss, Plaintiff’s estate amended their Complaint and added the administrators of the nursing home as individual defendants, who were Pennsylvania residents, and filed a Motion to remand the matter back to state court. Defendants then moved to strike the Amended Complaint and opposed the Motion to remand.

Holding

Given that the joinder took place as a result of a permissible Amended Complaint, the District Court noted that it had authority to review the joinder under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In analyzing the appropriateness of the joinder, the District Court considered the factors set forth in Hensgens v. Deere & Co., 833 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir. 1987), which are: (1) the extent to which the purpose of the amendment is to defeat federal jurisdiction; (2) whether plaintiff has been dilatory in asking for amendment; (3) whether plaintiff will be significantly injured if amendment is not allowed; and (4) any other factors bearing on equities. Following briefing and oral argument, and after consideration of the Hensgens factors, the District Court held that the joinder of the individual Defendants was impermissible and granted the Defendants’ Motion to strike as it related to the naming of the individual Defendants. Given that Plaintiff’s estate was aware of the identity of the individual Defendants prior to commencing litigation and the timing of the joinder, the District Court noted that it appeared that the sole motivation in amending the Compliant was to destroy diversity.

Questions about this case can be directed to Brook Dirlam at (412) 926-1438 or bdirlam@tthlaw.com.

Brown v. White
Federal District Court for Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No. 2:21-CV-01387-KSM

Decided: May 25, 2022

Claim for punitive damages against Greyhound bus driver for cell phone data use survives Motion for Summary Judgment.

Background

Ms. Brown was a passenger on a Greyhound bus on an overnight route from New York to Pittsburg. Mr. White was the driver of the bus. Ms. Brown slept for most of the trip, but woke twice when the bus veered onto rumble strips on the side of the road. She woke again at 4:45 a.m. when the bus rear-ended a tractor trailer. The tractor trailer was illuminated and clearly visible; however, Mr. White did not see it until immediately before impact and did not have time to apply the brakes. Evidence indicated that from 3:00 a.m. – 6:00 a.m., Mr. White used 121.54 MB of “mobile data,” suggesting he was using his cell phone while driving the bus. Ms. Brown sustained injuries as a result of the accident and brought suit against Mr. White, alleging that his negligence and/or recklessness caused the accident. She sought punitive damages.

Under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages are an extreme remedy that may be awarded when it is established that a Defendant acted in an outrageous fashion due to an evil motive or a reckless indifference to the rights of others. Recklessness may be found where one’s conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to another and such risk is substantially greater than that which is necessary to make the conduct negligent. Mr. White filed a Motion for partial summary judgment on Ms. Brown’s punitive damage requests, arguing that Ms. Brown had not produced evidence to prove Mr. White was using his cell phone at the time of the accident, or that he was reckless.

Holding

The Court disagreed, reminding Defendant that, when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, as the summary judgment standard requires, there was sufficient evidence that Mr. White was using his cell phone at the time of the accident, based on the amount of “mobile data” used in the three-hour window around the accident, and the “glowing light” that appeared in his lap near his left hand as seen on dash cam footage. Based on his decision to use his cell phone while driving, the Court found that a jury could find Mr. White reckless, as there were “aggravating factors” that made his use “particularly egregious,” including: (1) he was driving a large bus with 22 passengers through the night; (2) he was driving as fast as the bus could go; (3) he was driving with only one hand on the steering wheel; and (4) he never tapped the brakes prior to the collision. “Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ms. Brown, a reasonable jury could find that Mr. White was reckless, so punitive damages are available.” The Motion for partial summary judgment filed by Mr. Brown was denied.

Questions about this case can be directed to Julia Morrison at (717) 441-7056 or jmorrison@tthlaw.com.

Russell v. Educ. Comm’n for Foreign Med. Graduates
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
No. 2:18-cv-05629

Decided: May 19, 2022

No valid claim asserted for negligent infliction of emotional distress where distress presented years after physical impact and too many events occurred within the chain of causation.

Background

Five years after the Plaintiffs were treated by an obstetrician, they learned that he had not graduated from medical school and was using a false identity. Plaintiffs sought damages for negligent infliction of emotional distress from the Defendant, a certification board tasked with screening international medical graduates (“IMGs”) to enable the IMGs to apply for residencies, other graduate medical educational programs, and to apply for state medical licenses. The obstetrician had applied to Defendant for certification on three different occasions; the second two of which he submitted false credentials. After receiving the third certification, the obstetrician was admitted to residency programs at several hospitals and was ultimately licensed to practice medicine in Maryland. Plaintiffs received treatment, including caesarian sections, in 2012, but did not learn of the obstetrician’s fraud until 2017. Plaintiffs sought class certification, and the Defendant filed for summary judgment.

The Court determined that because the Defendant’s decisions regarding certification occurred in Pennsylvania, the law of that jurisdiction applied even though the physical impact occurred in Maryland because the case is not against the obstetrician, but the certifying board. In granting summary judgment for the Defendant, the Court determined that the physical impact suffered by the Plaintiffs was remote in time and was not accompanied by emotional distress until years later, once they reconceived their memories in light of new information. Plaintiffs’ “zone of danger” argument also failed because there was no fear of physical impact at the time, but only after realizing that the provider was unqualified to render treatment. The Court also determined that the claim lacked proximate cause because although the Defendant certified the obstetrician, each hospital, medical practice and licensing board conducted its own investigations into the qualifications of the obstetrician and exercised their own discretion in permitting him to practice.

Holding

The Trial Court entered summary judgment in favor of the certifying board due to a failure to satisfy the elements for negligent infliction of emotional distress and the exercise of discretion by later actors lessened the link between Defendant’s certification and the Plaintiffs’ harm.

Questions about this case can be directed to James F. Swartz, III at (610) 332-7028 or jswartz@tthlaw.com.