eNotes: Liability – December 2025 – Pennsylvania
December 02, 2024
SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Pennsylvania Case Summaries
Diakite v. Moses
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 3050 EDA 2023
Decided: October 18, 2024
Superior Court affirms evidence of the cost of anticipated medical treatment must be provided when seeking damages for future medical treatment.
Background
Plaintiff Mohamed Diakite filed suit against Fatinah Moses arising from a motor vehicle accident in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Shortly after the accident, Diakite presented to the hospital complaining of neck pain. His head and neck CT scans were normal. Diakite did not seek other medical treatment. He stayed home for two weeks, then he went back to work. At the direction of his attorney, he then began physical therapy. He continued PT for 3 ½ months. He has received no other treatment.
Prior to trial, Moses filed a Motion in limine to preclude Diakite’s expert, Dr. Christian Fras, an orthopedic surgeon, from testifying about Diakite’s future medical treatment and costs. The Motion was filed because, at his deposition, Dr. Fras stated that although Diakite had not been treated for several years, Diakite would require future medical treatment, including physical therapy and pain management interventions. The Trial Court denied the Motion and allowed the admission of Dr. Fras’ deposition at trial. The jury found Moses to be negligent and awarded Diakite $25,000 in damages. Moses filed a Post-Trial Motion seeking a new trial, arguing that Trial Court erred in allowing Dr. Fras to speculate regarding the future costs of Diakite’s treatment and that the $25,000 verdict was excessive. The Trial Court granted this Post-Trial Motion, vacated the jury verdict, and granted a new trial. Diakite appealed.
Holding
Based on his examination of Diakite and review of the medical records, Dr. Fras opined that Diakite suffered permanent injuries and that he will need future treatment, including physical therapy, injections, radiofrequency ablation, and cervical decompression and fusion at C5-6. The law is clear that “the movant must prove, by expert testimony, not only that future medical expenses will be incurred, but also the reasonable cost of such services.” Despite stating that Diakite will require future treatment, Dr. Fras did not present any evidence of the cost of such treatment. Therefore, the Trial Court should have precluded Dr. Fras from testifying to any potential future treatment. Additionally, because Dr. Fras’ testimony was instrumental in establishing Diakite’s injuries and potential need for additional treatment, the Trial Court properly granted a new trial limited to damages.
Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.
Schmidt v. Pa. Dep’t of Transp.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 33 C.D. 2023
Decided: October 11, 2024
Pursuant to the Sovereign Immunity Act, PennDOT found immune from suit for an “injurious tree” claim where the base of the tree that fell and crushed decedent did not originate from PennDOT real estate.
Background
Geoffrey J. Schmidt sustained fatal injuries after the branch of a large tree fell and crushed his vehicle as he drove along a Commonwealth highway. The tree branch hung over the road, reached into PennDOT’s right of way, but the base of the tree grew from property owned by SEPTA. PennDOT moved for summary judgment under the Sovereign Immunity Act. Plaintiff opposed with an expert report wherein the expert opined that the branch of the tree “was within PennDOT’s right of way,” thus bringing the cause of action within the real estate exception to Sovereign Immunity. The Trial Court denied summary judgment, reasoning that the “dangerous condition” of the tree overhanging the Commonwealth highway was subject to the real estate exception.
Holding
The Court reviewed the “real estate exception” by noting that the “dangerous condition must derive, originate from or have as its source the Commonwealth realty.” Under a line of cases dealing with “injurious trees,” the Court explained that the threshold legal requirement is whether the “dangerous condition originated from Commonwealth realty.” Thus, the exception is not triggered if the “base of the tree was located on property that was not owned by the Commonwealth”. Accordingly, the real estate exception did not apply because the “injurious tree grew from property owned by SEPTA, four feet outside of PennDOT’s right-of-way.”
Questions about this case can be directed to Javier Zurita at (267)-861-7591 or jzurita@tthlaw.com.
Harkins v. Three Monkeys Croyden, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 637 EDA 2023
Decided: August 2, 2024
In this unpublished decision, the Superior Court reiterated, inter alia, that a plaintiff must come forward with prima facie evidence to support their slip and fall claims, including causation, to survive summary judgment.
Background
In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she visited Defendant bar, and while at the establishment, slipped and fell, sustaining injuries to her right knee. Plaintiff was wearing heels at the time of the slip and fall. In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that she slipped by reason of a dangerous, defective carpet and/or tile floor. At her deposition, Plaintiff testified that no food or other substance caused her to slip and fall; rather, she slipped because of a wave in the carpet or the rubber edge of the carpet. Plaintiff was unable to confirm whether a wave in the carpet existed prior to or only after her fall. Other fact witnesses were similarly unable to state what caused Plaintiff to fall.
The Trial Court granted Defendant bar’s motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court found that Plaintiff failed to provide adequate testimony about the factual cause of her injuries. Plaintiff appealed.
Holding
The Superior Court, reviewing the Trial Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion or error of law, affirmed the Trial Court’s Order. The Superior Court reiterated that the mere occurrence of an accident is not evidence of negligence; rather, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that a defendant was negligent and that the negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff’s accident. Here, the Plaintiff failed to adduce record evidence to show that any alleged defect caused her fall. Summary judgment was properly granted, and the Trial Court’s Order was affirmed.
Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.