eNotes: Liability – February 2025 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Bazzano v. Spade
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 99 WDA 2024

Decided: December 23, 2024

Trial Court did not err when it ruled that a guilty plea for criminal charges from the subject accident and two prior DUIs were inadmissible.

Background

While operating his vehicle, Defendant struck Frank Bazzano, a pedestrian, in a parking lot. Defendant entered a guilty plea to simple assault and recklessly endangering another person, misdemeanors of the second degree, related to this incident. Defendant admitted fault for the accident in the civil suit therefore the only issue before the jury was Plaintiffs’ damages. Defendant also sought to preclude evidence of two prior driving under the influence convictions. The Trial Court granted Defendant’s Motions to preclude evidence of his guilty plea and the past DUI convictions. After trial, the Jury awarded $7,500 to Plaintiffs and no punitive damages. Plaintiff appealed claiming the Trial Court erred when it prevented Plaintiff from entering evidence of the guilty plea and the two prior DUI convictions.

Holding

As to Defendant’s guilty plea to simple assault and recklessly endangering another person, the Superior Court noted that a misdemeanor that was the result of a guilty plea is distinguishable from a felony conviction, after a trial, and there was no abuse of discretion by the Trial Court. Defendant admitted liability in the civil case and damages were the only issue for the Jury. Any relevance of a guilty plea as a statement against interest would have been outweighed by its prejudicial effect. As to the two prior DUI convictions, Plaintiff argued that they were relevant to show a habit and pattern of recklessness. However, there was no evidence of Defendant being under the influence at the time of the subject accident. Therefore, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it found no relevance and the prejudicial impact outweighed any potential relevance.

Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.

McKeehan v. Milton S. Hershey Med. Ctr.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2024 Pa. Super. 290

Decided: December 6, 2024

Superior Court of Pennsylvania rules that notes and other supportive materials created in the development of expert reports need not be produced where the expert reports fully disclosed the substance of the facts and opinions to which the experts were expected to testify, as well as the grounds for their opinions, satisfying the requirements of Rule 4003.5(a)(1).

Background

The McKeehan Plaintiffs appealed an Order of the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas granting a Motion to compel by Defendant Milton S. Hershey Medical Center. The Order compelled the disclosure of notes, recordings, photographs, and videos of meetings attended by Plaintiffs and their experts. The experts included a doctor and life care planner whose reports were served on Defendants.

Plaintiffs appealed the order setting forth as their main arguments that the notes taken by the experts fell into the definition of drafts, that the opposing party cannot compel expert opinions beyond what is stated in the report, and that Defendant needed to demonstrate good cause for an order to produce the notes. Further, due to the presence of counsel at some of these meetings, Plaintiffs also asserted that the records were privileged under both the work product doctrine and attorney-client privilege.

Holding

The Court determined that the Order compelling the disclosure of notes and other materials exceeded the scope of expert witness discovery permitted under Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 4003.5. In keeping with this ruling, the Court found that Rule 4003.5(a)(1) narrowly defines the permissible scope of expert discovery to only the facts and opinions, as well the basis for these opinions, to which an expert is expected to testify. Therefore, absent good cause and a Court Order under Rule 4003.5(a)(2), no further discovery beyond the expert report is mandated by the Rule.

Questions about this case can be directed to Michael Moran at (267) 861-7598 or mmoran@tthlaw.com.

Middaugh v. Horacek
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 331 EDA 2023

Decided: November 19, 2024

Superior Court affirms summary judgment where Plaintiff was sanctioned for failure to comply with Court Orders.

Background

Plaintiffs Raymond and Amanda Middaugh are husband and wife, and Plaintiff Sarina Middaugh is their adult daughter. Plaintiffs filed separate actions against Defendants alleging Raymond and Amanda Middaugh were passengers in an automobile operated by Sarina Middaugh on August 31, 2009, when a vehicle driven by Horacek struck them from behind. Plaintiffs brought negligence claims against Horacek and UIM claims against their automobile insurance carrier, State Farm. The actions proceeded to discovery. On August 30, 2013, Horacek filed a Motion to compel the depositions of Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs filed a Counter-Motion seeking to compel Horacek’s deposition. On March 10, 2015, the Trial Court ordered all depositions to be completed within 45 days. Horacek filed a second Motion to compel on March 20, 2017. Plaintiffs filed a Counter-Motion to compel. On June 6, 2017, the Court ordered all depositions within 60 days.

On August 14, 2017, Horacek filed a Motion for sanctions. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on September 6, 2017. Oral argument on the Motion for sanctions took place on September 7, 2017. While the Lower Court held the matter under advisement, Plaintiffs’ depositions were taken. On April 2, 2018, the Trial Court granted Horacek’s Motion, imposing monetary sanctions and preclusion of evidence of damages. Plaintiffs sought reconsideration, which was denied. Horacek then filed a Motion for summary judgment arguing Plaintiffs failed to present evidence on one of the essential elements of their negligence claim, that they suffered damages from the accident, as a result of the April 2, 2018, Order precluding same. The Trial Court granted this Motion. State Farm also filed a Motion for summary judgment alleging that, without Horacek in the case, Plaintiffs could not prove that Horacek was the underinsured. This was also granted.

Holding

Under circumstances where the sanction results in dismissal of an action, a “stringent” standard is applied and the appropriateness of the sanction is “strictly scrutinize[d].” This Court articulated factors to apply when analyzing the stringent application of a sanctions award. On application, the Court found these factors supported the sanction of dismissal in this case. The Superior Court agreed that Plaintiffs’ repeated refusal to sit for depositions substantially prejudiced Horacek’s ability to litigate this matter. Additionally, the coordinate jurisdiction rule, under which judges of coordinate jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule one another’s decisions, was not at issue because an independent review of the sanctions Order was not “clearly erroneous,” and the completion of Plaintiffs’ depositions did not constitute a substantial change in the facts.

Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.

Werner v. 1281 King Assocs., LLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
327 A.3d 291

Decided: November 13, 2024

Language “arising out of” in termination agreement was clear and unambiguous such that it released Defendants from liability claims relating to the distribution agreement.

Background

Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a Distributer Agreement, which designated Plaintiff as the exclusive independent distributor for Defendant’s products in a specific geographic territory. Plaintiff subsequently alleged that he was injured while on Defendant’s premises. The parties then entered into a Termination Agreement in which Defendant agreed to allow Plaintiff to assign his distribution rights to another party in exchange for termination of the parties’ Distributor Agreement. The Termination Agreement included a clause in which Plaintiff released Defendant from any and all actions “in any way arising out of, relating to, or having any connection with the Distributor Agreement.” Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit against Defendants alleging negligence. The Defendant filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that the Termination Agreement language barred the negligence action, which were sustained. Plaintiff appealed.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s Order sustaining the Defendant’s Preliminary Objections, finding that the language in the Termination Agreement was clear and unambiguous in releasing liability against the Defendant, as the Plaintiff was injured while in the performance of his business obligations under the Distributor Agreement. The Superior Court also held that a release does not need to specifically reference a particular claim or injury at issue to be enforceable.

Questions about this case can be directed to Brook Dirlam at (412) 926-1438 or bdirlam@tthlaw.com.

Toth v. Chambersburg Hosp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 208 M.D.A. 2024

Decided: October 15, 2024

Pennsylvania Superior Court confirms that the Pennsylvania Legislature’s intent of immunity for actions of mental healthcare providers under the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”), 50 P.S. § 7114, will stand absent a showing of “gross negligence.”

Background

This case involves Plaintiff’s decedent who was diagnosed with dementia and was injured after falling while pushing an aide away and attempting escape the care of Defendant Hospital. Plaintiff was involuntarily held at Defendant Hospital under Section 302 of the MHPA for emergency psychiatric evaluation. Plaintiff’s decedent had a history of dementia and was designated a high fall risk, requiring staff supervision for all ambulation. Plaintiff’s decedent was supervised at all times during her stay. One day during treatment, Plaintiff’s decedent pushed her supervising staff member and attempted to run; however, she fell and complained of pain in her hip. She remained in the behavioral health unit for several days and eventually was transferred to a trauma center. She was diagnosed with a fracture of her left acetabulum and eventually succumbed to the complications due to the fall and fracture.

Plaintiff commenced a survival and wrongful death action, asserting negligence against the Defendant Hospital. The Hospital was granted summary judgment, asserting the conduct complained of did not establish willful misconduct or gross negligence; in the absence of such conduct, the hospital was immune from civil liability pursuant to the MPHA. The Trial Court determined that the MPHA applied to Plaintiff’s claim and ruled that no reasonable person could conclude that the Hospital’s conduct constituted gross negligence or willful misconduct, and therefore, summary judgment was appropriate. On appeal to the Superior Court, Plaintiff argued that the MPHA did not apply in this matter, and even if it did, there was sufficient evidence to allow a reasonable person to conclude that the Hospital’s conduct giving rise to the death constituted gross negligence or willful misconduct.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court first discussed its previous definition of “gross negligence” under the MHPA. To the Superior Court, it appeared that the legislature intended to require that liability be premised on facts indicating more egregiously deviant conduct than ordinary carelessness, inadvertence, laxity or indifference. “The behavior of the defendant must be flagrant, grossly deviating from the ordinary standard of care.” The Court continued stating: “This definition is a clear, reasonable, and workable definition of gross negligence which is consistent with the purpose and intent of the [MHPA].” Further, “a court may take the issue of gross negligence from a jury and decide the issue as a matter of law if the conduct in question falls short of gross negligence, the case is entirely free from doubt, and no reasonable jury could find gross negligence.”

In the instant matter, Plaintiff’s Complaint did not list allegations of “gross negligence” and his experts did not mention gross negligence in their reports. Nonetheless, Plaintiff attempted to argue that gross negligence can be inferred from the Hospital’s conduct and the expert’s opinions. However, both the Trial Court and the Superior Court determined that Plaintiff’s experts did not use the terms “flagrant” or “gross” to modify the stated deviations from the standard of care. Accordingly, the Superior Court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that the Hospital’s conduct in caring for Plaintiff’s decedent was grossly negligent.

Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.