eNotes: Liability – February 2025 – Washington, DC
February 03, 2025
SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES
Washington, DC Case Summary
Jacobson v. Clack
No. 22-CV-0523
D.C. Court of Appeals
Decided: February 15, 2024
Attorney’s fees awarded in Anti-SLAPP Act action.
Background
Mark Jacobson (“Jacobson”) sued the National Academy of Sciences (“NAS”) and Christopher Clack (“Clack”) for defamation following their publishing of an article critical of his scientific research in a NAS’ academic journal. Clack primarily authored the article.
In response, Clack and NAS filed special Motions to dismiss under the District of Columbia Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation Act, or Anti-SLAPP Act, D.C. Code §§ 16-5501-5505. During a Motions hearing, the Trial Court indicated its intent to grant the Defendants’ Motions, and Jacobson then voluntarily dismissed the suit. Clack and NAS then moved for attorneys’ fees under the Anti-SLAPP Act’s fee-shifting provision. The provision allows a court to award attorneys’ fees to a defendant who “prevails in whole or part” in their special motion to dismiss. The Trial Court granted their Motion for attorneys’ fees and awarded $428,723 to NAS and $75,000 to Clack. Jacobson then appealed the award of attorneys’ fees to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals. Jacobson argued that the voluntary dismissal of his suit did not satisfy the requirement under the Anti-SLAPP Act’s fee shifting provision that a party “prevail[] in whole or part” in its special Motion to dismiss to be granted attorneys’ fees.
Holding
The Court affirmed the Superior Court’s award of attorneys’ fees. The Court found that the D.C. Anti-SLAPP Act, unlike its contemporaries in other jurisdictions, contains broad language that triggers the fee shifting to any party that “prevails, in whole or part” on its special Motion to dismiss. It is not limited to circumstances where “the court grants” a special motion to dismiss. The Court further reasoned that the legislative history and purpose of the Anti-SLAPP Act showed that the D.C. Council intended to give trial courts considerable leeway to grant fees in line with the purpose of the Anti-SLAPP Act, which is to discourage harassing and meritless litigation. Finally, the Court determined that NAS and Clack’s special Motion to dismiss would have prevailed but for the voluntary dismissal, thus warranting the Trial Court’s award of attorneys’ fees.
Questions about this case can be directed to Meredith Bestland at (443) 641-0560 or mbestland@tthlaw.com.