eNotes: Liability – January 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

McHenry v. The Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court
No. 373 C.D. 2022

Decided: November 14, 2023

If an employee’s occupational disease exceeds the compensable period defined by the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act, and the employee does not qualify for compensation under the Act, the exclusive remedy provision does not apply, permitting the pursuit of civil claims.

Background

The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company appealed the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas’ Order denying Goodyear’s Motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Robert McHenry, a former employee, filed a civil tort action alleging that he contracted asbestosis from exposure to asbestos-containing products during his employment with Goodyear. Goodyear argued that McHenry’s claims fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board under the Pennsylvania Occupational Disease Act (“ODA”). The Trial Court rejected Goodyear’s argument, citing an exception recognized in Herold v. University of Pittsburgh, which allows civil actions when latent occupational diseases are not compensable under the workers’ compensation system. The Court also relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Tooey v. AK Steel Corp., which excluded claims arising from certain latent occupational diseases.

Holding

The Appellate Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, holding that the Herold exception applied to McHenry’s case. The Court clarified that McHenry, who was diagnosed with asbestosis 27 years after his last workplace exposure, did not fall under the ODA’s compensable disability or death provisions due to the extended latency of his occupational disease. The Court also considered the ODA’s savings clause, but found McHenry’s lack of total disability rendered the savings clause inapplicable. The Court concluded that, since McHenry’s occupational disease was not compensable, the ODA’s exclusivity provision did not apply, allowing him to proceed with his civil claims in common pleas court. The Court rejected Goodyear’s arguments regarding Auer deference, exclusive jurisdiction, and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, emphasizing that McHenry’s case did not involve a dispute over the timing of the diagnosis or relevant economic evidence establishing an inability to earn wages. The Court affirmed the Trial Court’s Order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matt Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

Nationwide Prop & Cas. Ins. v. Castaneda
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super 253

Decided: December 5, 2023

An unlicensed driver exclusion in an insurance policy cannot be invoked to deny mandatory first-party medical expense benefits unless explicitly listed in Section 1718 of the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law.

Background

Christina Tapia Castaneda, driving her mother’s car without a valid driver’s license but with her mother’s permission, was involved in a rear-end collision, resulting in severe injuries. She submitted a claim for first-party medical expense benefits to Nationwide Property and Casualty Insurance Company, the insurer of her mother’s vehicle. Nationwide denied the claim, citing an unlicensed driver exclusion in the insurance policy. Christina argued that this exclusion was not valid under the Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law (“MVFRL”), at least when applied to statutorily-mandated first-party medical expense benefits. The Trial Court sided with Nationwide, holding that the exclusion was valid, and entered judgment in favor of the insurer. Christina Tapia Castaneda appealed, contending that the Trial Court erred in finding the unlicensed driver exclusion applicable.

Holding

The Superior Court emphasized that the MVFRL mandates insurers to provide first-party medical expense coverage for injuries arising from the use of a motor vehicle. While Section 1718 of the MVFRL enumerates certain grounds for excluding individuals from recovering first-party benefits, being an unlicensed driver is not among them. Ms. Tapia Castaneda argued that the legislative intent was to limit exclusions to those explicitly listed in Section 1718, ensuring broad and mandatory coverage for medical expenses. The Court agreed, asserting that the legislature intended only the specified exclusions in Section 1718 to be valid in the context of mandatory medical expense benefits. The Court distinguished cases cited by Nationwide, noting they involved different coverages and did not address the mandatory nature of medical expense benefits. Ultimately, the Court concluded that the unlicensed driver exclusion was not a valid basis for denying first-party medical expense benefits. Accordingly, the Superior Court reversed the judgment in favor of Nationwide and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its Opinion.

Questions about this case can be directed to Matt Mangapora at (412) 926-1437 or mmangapora@tthlaw.com.

Adorno v. Ortiz
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2572 EDA 2022

Decided: November 20, 2023

Statements in medical records made for medical diagnosis and treatment were admissible hearsay pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(4).

Background

Plaintiff commenced an action seeking money damages for serious injuries arising out of an alleged dog attack. Defendants maintained that their dog did not bite Plaintiff and that Plaintiff was actually bitten by a stray dog while he was at a car wash. Prior to trial, the Lower Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion in limine seeking to preclude admission of medical records which contained notations that Plaintiff “was bit by a stray dog,” that “patient states he was bit by an unknown dog while washing his car,” and that Plaintiff “states he was washing his car when a dog bit him.” The case proceeded to trial and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Defendants, finding them not negligent. Plaintiff filed an appeal after the denial of Post-Trial Motions, which claimed that the Trial Court erred in allowing the admission of hearsay statements contained in Plaintiff’s medical records.

Holding

The Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence provide an exception to the hearsay rule for statements made for medical diagnosis or treatment. See Pa.R.E. 803(4). The Comment to this rule explains that “[s]tatements as to causation may be admissible, but statements as to fault or identification of the person inflicting harm have been held to be inadmissible.” Pa.R.E. 803(4) cmt. Accordingly, under Rule 803(4), there are two requirements for a hearsay statement to come within this exception: “First, the declarant must make the statement for the purpose of receiving medical treatment, and second, the statement must be necessary and proper for diagnosis and treatment.”

The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that the evidentiary record supported the Trial Court’s determination that the statements contained in Plaintiff’s medical records were made in furtherance of medical treatment and were necessary for proper treatment. The Court reasoned that the statements were neither inconsequential nor irrelevant to medical treatment, as the dog’s status as an unknown or stray dog informed the physician’s decision to treat Plaintiff for rabies and were reasonably pertinent to Plaintiff’s treatment plan. Therefore, the medical records were admissible under the medical rules exception to the rule against hearsay.

Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7925 or rburch@tthlaw.com.

Biela v. Carney Plumbing, Heating & Cooling, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 727 EDA 2023

Decided: November 1, 2023

Superior Court addresses statute of repose and related issue of whether oil tank was a fixture.

Background

Biela hired Carney Plumbing, Heating & Cooling, Inc. in August 2004 to install an above ground oil tank to replace a tank they previously had in their basement. This was completed at the recommendation of a Carney employee. On January 24, 2019, the tank was filled with more than 190 gallons of oil when it burst, leaking oil onto and damaging Biela’s property. Biela filed suit against Carney, alleging negligence for the installation of the tank and breach of contract for failure to inspect, evaluate, and remedy any issue with Biela’s heating system. Carney filed a Motion for summary judgment prior to trial, arguing that Biela’s claims were barred by the statute of repose because the tank was installed fifteen years prior to the inciting incident. The Trial Court denied the Motion.

Carney again filed a Motion in support of the statute of repose at trial. The Trial Court also denied this Motion finding that, based on the evidence presented, the above-ground oil tank was not a “fixture” because it merely sat on top of cement lintels. After Biela completed her case, Carney moved for directed verdict again on the basis of the statute of repose. Again, the Court denied this Motion. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Biela for both negligence and breach of contract. Carney’s Post-Trial Motions for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or alternatively a new trial were also denied. Carney then appealed on four issues, primary was whether the JNOV by directed verdict should be entered where Biela’s claims were barred by the statute of repose.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the holding of the Trial Court. The Superior Court agreed with the logic of the Trial Court, identifying that an oil tank is not a fixture because it merely sat upon cement slabs, and was “not affixed, attached, not even fastened by bolts to the real property.” The Superior Court highlighted that oil tanks, as evidenced in this case, are meant to be replaced periodically. The Court further agreed that this outdoor tank, replacing an indoor tank, had evidence of conduct by both parties that the tank was not intended to be a permanent feature of the property. The Superior Court also noted that Carney failed to prove that removal of the tank would cause damage to the real property, which was a burden they possessed to show it was a permanent fixture. The Superior Court affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court in regards to Carney’s other claims on appeal as well.

Questions about this case can be directed to Logan Nagle at (717) 255-7234 or lnagle@tthlaw.com.