eNotes: Liability – January 2025 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Smith v. Rodriguez
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2127 EDA 2023 (non-precedential decision)

Decided: December 3, 2024

The Superior affirms the Order entered by the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas sustaining Preliminary Objections to venue and transferring the case from Philadelphia County to Northampton County, because merely hiring third-party vendors operating in Philadelphia fails to satisfy the “regularly conducting business” requirement.

Background

Plaintiff Akheem Smith’s action arose out of a forklift accident in Northampton County. Defendant Kuehne and Nagel, Inc. objected to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the basis of improper venue. Plaintiff’s Complaint set forth claims of negligence against the accident driver, Kelvin Rodriguez, a resident of Lehigh County, and an employee of Kuehne and Nagel. Kuehne and Nagel is a New York corporation, with a principal place of business in Jersey City, New Jersey. The company serves as a “go-between” logistics company arranging supply chain connections between customers and third-party transportation companies. The company does not own transportation equipment or machinery. Plaintiff contended that venue was proper because Kuehne and Nagel hired transportation companies to pick up customer cargo at both the Philadelphia airport and seaport, which acts were essential to Kuehne and Nagel’s existence. The Trial Court sustained Preliminary Objections, finding that “coordinating shipments” did not amount to regularly conducting business in Philadelphia.

Holding

The Superior Court noted that even though the accident occurred in Northampton County, and the operator, Rodriguez, resided in Lehigh County, the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure allow an action to proceed in any county “in which the venue may be laid against any one of the defendants.” As to a corporation like Kuehne and Nagel, venue is proper where “the corporation or similar entity regularly conducts business.” In this case, the determination turned on “whether hiring transportation companies” amounted to “sufficient, quality acts,” that is, activities “directly, furthering or essential to, corporate objects.” The Superior Court upheld the Trial Court’s determination and reasoned that Kuehne and Nagel “hire transportation companies . . . to do the actual moving of the goods,” which process is overseen from the company’s “office in Delaware County,” and Kuehne and Nagel never perform “direct action in Philadelphia.”

Questions about this case can be directed to Javier Zurita at (267)-861-7591 or jzurita@tthlaw.com.

Sellers v. Erie Ins. Exch.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1431 MDA 2023

Decided: November 5, 2024

Superior Court affirms that evidence of the cost of anticipated medical treatment must be provided when seeking damages for future medical treatment.

Background

Erie Insurance Exchange issued Plaintiff Kenneth Sellers an automobile insurance policy identifying Sellers as the named insured, and providing bodily injury liability coverage in the amount of $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. The policy also provided uninsured motorist coverage and underinsured motorist coverage in the amount of $25,000 per person/$50,000 per accident, as elected by Sellers. Sellers renewed this policy between 2009 and 2018, adding additional automobiles and two trailers. Sellers opted for stacking of these UM/UIM benefits. Sellers also had a motorcycle insured by Blessing because Erie did not insure motorcycles at the time of purchase. Sellers purchased a second motorcycle in 2018 and was informed by Blessing that Erie now insured motorcycles. Subsequently, Sellers moved both motorcycles to his Erie policy.

In 2018, Sellers was riding one of his motorcycles when he was involved in a accident and sustained injuries. The tortfeasor’s liability insurance policy limits provided insufficient coverage, so Sellers submitted a claim for UIM benefits under his Erie policy. Erie accepted the UIM claim and provided the full, per person policy limits stacked over six vehicles for a total claim payment to Sellers of $150,000. Sellers initiated the instant litigation, asserting a claim for breach of contract against Erie and claims for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty against Blessing. Following discovery, Erie and Blessing filed Motions for summary judgment, and Sellers filed a Cross-Motion for summary judgment. The Trial Court entered separate Orders granting the Motions filed by Erie and Blessing and denying Sellers’ Cross-Motion.

Holding

Sellers filed a timely notice of appeal. However, the Trial Court ordered him to file and serve on the Trial Court a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) by October 6, 2023. This Order explained that any issue not raised or addressed in the statement shall be deemed waived. Sellers failed to do so timely, and the Trial Court entered a statement in lieu of opinion. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has clearly held as a bright-line rule that “failure to comply with the minimal requirements of Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) will result in automatic waiver of the issues raised.” Based on the express language of the Trial Court Order and that due notice was given to the parties, the Superior Court held that all of Sellers’ issues were waived for failure to timely file his Rule 1925(b) statement.

Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.

Dailey v. Smith
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2024 Pa. Super. 235

Decided: October 10, 2024

Trial Court erred by failing to charge the jury on Plaintiff’s comparative negligence.

Background

This personal injury action arose out of a two-car accident at the intersection of Broad and Reed Streets in Philadelphia. The accident occurred when Defendant, who was traveling northbound on Broad Street, made a left turn while Plaintiff was driving southbound on Broad Street and Plaintiff’s car collided with Defendant’s car. While Plaintiff argued that Defendant made a left turn in front of him when he was almost in the intersection, Plaintiff admitted that he was driving 30 to 35 miles per hour and that the speed limit was 25 miles per hour. Defendant testified that she believed when she started her turn that she could make the turn safely and that she did not see Plaintiff’s car until she began her turn. At the close of evidence, the trial court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for directed verdict and denied Defendant’s Motion for directed verdict, ruling that Defendant could not present the question of Plaintiff’s comparative negligence to a jury.

For comparative negligence to be submitted to a jury, there must be evidence from which the jury could find both that Plaintiff was negligent and that his negligence caused the injuries for which he seeks damages. Plaintiff’s admissions that he was driving 30 to 35 miles per hour and that the posted speed limit was 25 miles per hour established as a matter of law that Plaintiff was negligent and required the Trial Court to instruct the jury that it must find Plaintiff negligent. The evidence also was sufficient for a jury to find that Plaintiff’s negligence was a cause of his alleged injuries. Based on the evidence, a jury could reasonably conclude that Plaintiff’s speeding affected Defendant’s ability to see him in time to judge her ability to make the left turn. A jury could also conclude that Plaintiff’s speeding contributed to the force of the accident and was therefore a cause of his injuries.

Holding

A new trial was required because the Trial Court erred in granting Plaintiff’s Motion for directed verdict and taking the issue of Plaintiff’s contributory negligence from the jury when there was sufficient evidence for the jury to find that Plaintiff’s negligence was a cause of the accident and his damages.

Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 322-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.

The Cont’l Ins. Co. v. Pa. Elec. Co.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 165 WDA 2024

Decided: October 8, 2024

Courts should consider the plain language of an insurance policy instead of Tooey rational when determining employer’s liability coverage for bodily injuries.

Background

This declaratory judgment action stems from an underlying suit filed jointly by Husband and Wife in July 2019 against Husband’s employer, Penelec, wherein they alleged that Husband developed an asbestos-related occupational disease for which both Plaintiffs claimed the need for medical monitoring and damages arising therefrom. In light of the fact that Husband had not worked at Penelec for more than 40 years prior to the commencement of the suit, Plaintiffs nonetheless brought claims against Penelec for, inter alia, medical monitoring and negligence pursuant to Tooey v. AK Steel Corporation, 81 A.3d 851 (Pa. 2013) (concluding that claims for occupational disease which manifests outside of the 300-week period prescribed by Pennsylvania’s Workers’ Compensation Act do not fall within the purview of WCA, and thus does not preclude an employee from filing a common law claim against an employer).

Penelec ultimately resolved the aforementioned claims asserted against it through a confidential settlement entered in October 2021. However, in August 2021, Continental Insurance Company (Penelec’s insurer) filed this action against Penelec seeking a declaration that it has no obligation to defend or indemnify Penelec because the bodily injury claims in the underlying action were barred by the policy’s Employer’s Liability Exclusion. Penelec argued that the claims are covered by the policy and that Continental had a duty to defend and indemnify it. Accordingly, Continental sought, inter alia, a declaration that it has no obligation to defend or indemnify Penelec under these circumstances. The Trial Court relied on Tooey in concluding that the alleged injuries did not fall within the purview of WCA, and thus did not meet the definition of an “injury” because the symptoms did not manifest within 300 weeks.

Holding

The issues on appeal were whether the Tooey rationale automatically results in coverage despite the employer liability exclusion, and additionally, whether there was available coverage for wife’s claims to medical monitoring. In this non-precedential decision, the Appellate Court held that Trial Court erred in relying on Tooey to conclude that the claims did not meet the definition of “injury.” The Court explained that the Trial Court incorrectly relied on Tooey because the proper approach would have considered the plain language of the policy and liberally construe it in favor of the insured. After a review of the plain language of the policy, the Court determined that Husband and Wife’s Complaint can be interpreted as alleging that Wife required medical monitoring due to her own exposure to asbestos, as opposed to an “employee’s” exposure, which fell within the definition of an “injury” not excluded by the policy.

Questions about this case can be directed to Haley Obrzut at (717)-255-7646 or hobrzut@tthlaw.com.