eNotes: Liability – July 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Salsberg v. Mann
Pennsylvania Supreme Court
No. 7 EAP 2022

Decided: February 21, 2024

Pennsylvania Supreme Court recognizes cause of action for intentional interference by a third party to an existing at-will employment relationship.

Background

This case arises out of an employment dispute. Ms. Salsberg was an at-will employee in the accounting office of Drexel University from 2011 through 2017. She was supervised by Ms. Mann. After a deterioration in the relationship between employee and supervisor, she was ultimately terminated. She brought suit against Mann and Drexel alleging, amongst other claims, that Ms. Mann intentionally interfered with her employment relationship with Drexel. Ms. Mann moved for summary judgment on the basis that Ms. Salsberg was an at-will employee, and intentional interference with at-will employment was not a recognized cause of action in Pennsylvania. The Trial Court granted summary judgment for Ms. Mann, and the Superior Court affirmed. The Supreme Court granted review.

Holding

The Supreme Court affirmed, but on other grounds. The Supreme Court noted the lack of law in Pennsylvania on the viability of a cause of action against a third party for intentional interference of at-will employment. The Supreme Court determined that Pennsylvania does recognize this cause of action, but with an important caveat. The cause of action requires the existence of an identifiable third party. Employees or agents of the employer, such as Ms. Mann in this case, are not third parties such that a cause of action can be supported. A party cannot interfere with its own contract. As such, a co-worker cannot be the third party in such claims unless the co-worker is acting outside of the scope of their employment. As Ms. Mann was acting in the course and scope of her employment at Drexel through her supervision of Ms. Salsberg, Ms. Mann was not a third party and summary judgment in her favor on the claim of intentional interference with at-will employment was appropriate.

Questions about this case can be directed to William Novick at (610) 332-7029 or wnovick@tthlaw.com.

Vivian v. Blank Rome, LLP
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2024 Pa. Super. 118

Decided: June 7, 2024

Pennsylvania Superior Court holds that defamation claims based upon a prior legal action are protected by judicial privilege and false light claims fail when such claims arise from true statements of fact.

Background

This matter arose out of the criminal conviction of Charles Cullen, a former St. Luke’s nurse, who confessed to involvement in the deaths of several of his patients. Various lawsuits were filed against St. Luke’s after Mr. Cullen’s actions came to light, including two wrongful death and survival actions filed by Attorney Vivian (the Plaintiff in the instant matter). Thereafter, the wrongful death actions were dismissed as Cullen did not admit to any wrongdoing with regard to the specific decedents involved in the wrongful death actions, and otherwise refused to participate in the discovery process.

Thereafter, St. Luke’s filed actions against Plaintiff Vivian and others involved in the wrongful death actions, claiming wrongful use of civil proceedings (also known as a “Dragonetti Action”). In conjunction with this suit, St. Luke’s issued a press release stating the background of the Dragonetti Action as well as its supporting opinions. In response, various newspaper articles were written in the days following the press release. Ultimately, St. Luke’s moved to partially discontinue that action. The estates involved in the original wrongful death suits then filed Dragonetti claims against St. Luke’s and its counsel, Blank Rome, as well as various other individual defendants. These cases were tried to verdict wherein the jury found St. Luke’s and Blank Rome lacked probable cause to initiate or continue the first Dragonetti Action against the Estates and did so with an improper purpose. However, the jury also found that the Estates suffered no damage as a result.

After resolution of this second Dragonetti Action, Plaintiff Vivian filed a Motion for summary judgment, as well as a Motion for collateral estoppel in the prior Dragonetti Action as certain of the claims remained. The Summary Judgment Motion was resolved with the Lower Court finding that jury verdict in the second Dragonetti Action had no preclusive effect upon the first action. The matter proceeded to trial but was ultimately settled.

Moving forward, Plaintiff filed the present action which is subject of the above-cited appellate decision, which was filed shortly after St. Luke’s had filed the first Dragonetti Action and issued the press release. The Complaint focused on the allegedly defamatory nature of the press release, which had been distributed to members of the news media. This suit also alleged that the first Dragonetti Action was improperly brought without any factual support. Defendants filed a Motion for summary judgment which was granted in full, and Plaintiff’s Complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

Holding

As to defamation, the Superior Court found that the statements within the press release and quoted statements by a St. Luke’s spokesperson in related newspaper articles could not support a defamation claim as the press release largely consisted of true statements of fact and any “opinions” accurately related that the original wrongful death actions filed on behalf of the estates were dismissed. While the press release contained the phrases “inappropriate” and “reprehensible” in referring to Plaintiff’s actions in conjunction with the original wrongful death suits, such opinion did not imply the existence of undisclosed defamatory facts. Finally, the Court found that St. Luke’s reference to its need to respond to “frivolous lawsuits” was not of defamatory character since the suits lacked an arguable basis in fact in light of the evidence adduced within those wrongful death cases.

Next, Plaintiff had also alleged a false light invasion of privacy claim alleging he was cast as a “scumbag and criminal” in having filed the original wrongful death suits. The Court held that the statements contained within the press release did not support a false light claim against the Defendants since it consisted of true statements of fact. Further, the press release did not contain a selective publication of true facts which would have created a false impression regarding Plaintiff. In sum, the press release did not rise to the level of implying that Plaintiff was engaged in sordid or illicit behavior and, therefore, Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on this issue.

Questions about this case can be addressed to Ryan C. Blazure at (570) 825-3867 or rblazure@tthlaw.com.

Mogollon v. Nguyen
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2068 EDA 2023

Decided: May 30, 2024

Superior Court addresses jury charge in automobile-skateboarder accident case.

Background

Plaintiff Mongollon and a friend were skateboarding towards a T-intersection in Chester County where his direction of travel had a stop sign controlling traffic. Plaintiff looked for traffic but determined an incoming pickup truck was far enough away to proceed. Plaintiff crossed the intersection turning left, traveling approximately twenty yards after the intersection before he was struck from behind by Nguyen. Mongollon suffered serious injuries and filed suit. Prior to trial, both parties filed numerous Motions in limine, which included a Motion to preclude any evidence or testimony of the stop sign Mongollon faced before entering the T-intersection. The Court denied the Motion, finding that the stop sign at issue was relevant for res gestae and comparative negligence purposes. The Court granted a Motion precluding evidence or testimony that Nguyen was speeding, as neither party had offered reliable testimony of Nguyen’s speed.

The trial began on March 27, 2023, and Plaintiff did not propose a jury charge pertaining to the “assured clear distance ahead” rule (75 Pa.C.S. § 3361). While the Court was determining the use of an instruction on the responsibility of a pedestrian crossing a roadway without a crosswalk to yield the right-of-way to vehicles (75 Pa.C.S. § 3543(a)), Plaintiff stated that he would withdraw his objection to an instruction based on Section 3543(a) as long as an instruction was given on the assured clear distance ahead. The Trial Court stated a belief that assured clear distance is no longer the law, and Plaintiff did not respond. The jury returned a verdict on March 28, 2023, finding that Mongollon was 51% negligent. Plaintiff’s Post-trial Motions were denied, and he then appealed, arguing that the decisions on the above Motions and jury instructions were an error of law or abuse of discretion.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decisions. The Superior Court held that it was not an abuse of discretion for the Trial Court to determine the stop sign was relevant to the circumstances leading to the accident, and not an abuse of discretion to preclude evidence of speeding given the absence of reliable evidence of Nguyen’s speed and Mongollon’s inadequate observation of the speed. Further, the Superior Court held that Plaintiff waived his right to appeal on the jury instruction for the assured clear distance rule because he did not object to the Court’s conclusion it is no longer law and would not be included. Lastly, the Superior Court held the Trial Court did not err in including the Section 3543(a) instruction as Mongollon had entered the intersection and did not yield to the oncoming pickup truck. Accordingly, the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decisions and the judgment in favor of Defendant Nguyen.

Questions about this case can be directed to Logan Nagle at (717) 255-7234 or lnagle@tthlaw.com.

Porter v. Health-Frankford
Pennsylvania Superior Court
1554 EDA 2023

Decided: May 30, 2024

In this unpublished decision, the Superior Court reiterated that in a premises liability case, a plaintiff must prove actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition.

Background

Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging bodily injury arising out of a slip and fall in Defendant Hospital’s bathroom due to a “sudden and unexpected emanation of water from the sink.” Plaintiff did not specifically identify the alleged dangerous condition of the sink. At trial, Plaintiff did not present testimony from a liability expert or offer any direct evidence regarding Defendant Hospital’s alleged negligent maintenance or inspection of the sink. The jury awarded Plaintiff $1.8 million. After the verdict, Defendant Hospital filed a motion for JNOV, which the Trial Court granted. Plaintiff appealed.

On appeal, inter alia, Plaintiff argued that the Trial Court abused its discretion by granting Defendant Hospital’s Motion for JNOV, arguing that the testimony was sufficient for a jury to find Defendant Hospital knew or should have known about the “dangerous condition” of the sink. In response, Defendant Hospital argued that there was no record evidence that the hospital had actual or constructive notice of a dangerous condition, and no evidence that a dangerous condition existed. Defendant Hospital bolstered its position with Plaintiff’s own testimony that she did not see any issue with the subject sink prior to using it.

Holding

The Superior Court, reviewing the Trial Court’s ruling for abuse of discretion or error of law, affirmed the Trial Court’s Order grant of Defendant Hospital’s Motion for JNOV. The Superior Court reiterated that in premises liability cases, a duty is only imposed on a defendant landowner if it has actual or constructive notice of such dangerous condition. Looking to the Trial Court’s Opinion, the Superior Court agreed that Plaintiff presented no evidence of the alleged defect with the sink, or evidence of Defendant Hospital’s actual or constructive notice of a defect with the sink. As a jury cannot resort to “conjecture, guess or suspicion,” the Trial Court properly granted Defendant Hospital’s Motion for JNOV.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.

Harris v. Sullivan
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2437 EDA 2022

Decided: May 16, 2024

Superior Court addresses sufficiency of allegations of defamation.

Background

Harris was attempting to return a toothbrush to his local CVS Pharmacy when the return was refused. While Harris stood at the checkout counter discussing the return with a CVS cashier and manager, Sullivan, who was standing more than 30 feet away and not known to Harris, stated loudly, multiple times, “He’s a child rapist,” referring to Harris. Sullivan’s statements were heard by CVS personnel and customers and caused some to react negatively to Harris. Sullivan then made a second statement about Harris, telling CVS customers that Harris threatened Sullivan by asking, “Do you want to catch a bullet?” After Sullivan told CVS employees of this alleged threat, Harris was arrested for making a terroristic threat.

Harris filed suit against Sullivan sounding in defamation. Sullivan filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer, arguing that Harris had not sufficiently plead all elements to establish that either of Sullivan’s statements were defamatory. The Trial Court agreed, finding that Harris had not adequately plead that the “child rapist” statement was directed to Harris, or that persons would understand it to be directed to him. It also found that Harris had not pled that the latter statement caused any damages to him. The Complaint was dismissed, and Harris appealed.

Holding

The Superior Court reversed, initially noting that “defamation per se occurs when the [alleged defamatory] statement ascribes to the plaintiff any of the following: commission of a criminal offense, a loathsome disease, serious sexual misconduct, or conduct or characteristics that adversely affect the plaintiff’s fitness to properly conduct his profession, trade or business.” The Court further stated that “[w]hen determining whether a communication is defamatory, the court will consider what effect the statement would have on the minds of the average persons among whom the statement would circulate.” The Court found that Harris adequately pled that Sullivan’s “child rapist” statement was directed towards Harris and found the statement constituted defamation per se. As for the latter statement about catching a bullet, the Superior Court likewise found that Harris plead sufficient facts to set forth a claim in defamation. It noted that the Trial Court improperly engaged in fact-finding when it concluded that causation as to damages was not established at the pleadings stage of the case.

Questions about this case can be directed to Julia Morrison at (717) 441-7056 or jmorrison@tthlaw.com.

Shultz v. York Hosp.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 984 MDA 2022

Decided: April 16, 2024

To establish a claim for corporate negligence, a breach of one of four distinct duties of care must exist.

Background

Plaintiff Shultz was admitted to Defendant York Hospital on September 25, 2014 for symptoms of a stroke following an operation in his leg for varicose veins. The hospital determined that it was safe to discharge Plaintiff and did so on September 26, 2014 even though a right leg ultrasound was not done to confirm or rule out the presence of deep vein thrombosis. Plaintiff returned to Defendant York Hospital on September 27, 2014 with stoke symptoms, much more severe than the earlier stroke. At this time, an ultrasound confirmed the presence of deep vein thrombosis which Plaintiff alleges should have been found previously. Plaintiff filed a Complaint against Defendant Hospital, which included claims of corporate negligence.

Prior to trial, the Court issued a ruling precluding Plaintiff’s expert from reading or citing to a 2010 Patient Safety Advisory, as the same was treated as an inadmissible learned treatise. Despite the Court’s ruling, Plaintiff’s expert read from the Advisory anyway and the Trial Court dismissed him as a witness. At the conclusion of Plaintiff’s case in chief, Defendant Hospital moved for a compulsory non-suit, arguing that without Plaintiff’s expert testimony, Plaintiff could not establish a claim of corporate negligence. The Trial Court granted the non-suit, Post-trial Motions were decided, and Plaintiff appealed.

Holding

On appeal, Plaintiff argued that the Trial Court erred in granting a non-suit as to his claim for corporate negligence. In its decision, the Superior Court cited to the seminal case of Thompson v. Nason Hosp., explaining that corporate negligence is “a doctrine under which the hospital is liable if it fails to uphold the proper standard of care owed the patient, which is to ensure the patient’s safety and well-being while at the hospital.” It was further explained that in defining the contours of this theory, the Supreme Cout channeled a hospital’s duties into “four general areas”: (1) a duty to use reasonable care in the maintenance of safe and adequate facilities and equipment; (2) a duty to select and retain only competent physicians; (3) a duty to oversee all persons who practice medicine within its walls as to patient care; and (4) a duty to formulate, adopt and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the patient.

The Superior Court concluded that the Trial Court correctly interpreted and applied the Supreme Court’s decision in Thompson. The Trial Court, in this matter, correctly observed that Thompson did not impose upon a hospital an overarching and general duty to ensure a patient’s safety and well-being. Instead, the Thompson Court, in explaining the scope of a hospital’s general responsibility, outlined the boundaries of the doctrine by imposing liability upon a hospital if it failed to uphold any of the four expressly enumerated duties.

Questions about this case can be directed Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.