eNotes: Liability – March 2025 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Watson v. Brown
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 539 EDA 2024

Decided: February 7, 2025

Plaintiffs waived all claims of alleged Trial Court error on appeal where their Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement of Errors was neither concise nor clear in its assertions.

Background

Plaintiffs Tammi Watson and Thomas Watson commenced a civil action in the Court of Common Pleas following a December 6, 2016 motor vehicle accident. Plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to serve Defendant Clair Brown, Jr. numerous times over the span of four years. Plaintiffs did not reinstate their Complaint from November 30, 2020 to September 2, 2022. On August 26, 2022, the Court granted Plaintiff’s Motion for alternative service, unaware that Defendant had died on April 4, 2020. Plaintiffs then filed an Affidavit of alternative service on October 18, 2022. After learning of Defendant’s death, Plaintiffs substituted Defendant’s wife as the named Defendant. Defendant then filed Preliminary objections to the Complaint based on improper service.

The Court found that Plaintiffs lacked due diligence in the failure to reinstate the Complaint, and that they did not make a good faith effort to serve Mr. Brown. The Court sustained Defendant’s Preliminary Objections and dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint, with prejudice, on January 10, 2024. Plaintiffs filed an appeal on February 9, 2024, and thereafter filed a six-page Rule 1925(b) Statement raising 23 issues on appeal. The Trial Court found that Plaintiffs waived all claims of alleged error based on their failure to properly file a concise Statement of Errors.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s decision. Pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(b), the judge entering the appealed-from order may enter an order directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court a concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal. Critically, the statement shall set forth only those errors that the appellant intends to assert. Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)(4)(i). Plaintiffs, in asserting over 23 errors on appeal of a simple service issue, failed to follow appellant procedure. The Superior Court went as far as to conclude that the Plaintiffs intentionally wasted the Trial Court’s time. To discourage appellate counsel from filing needlessly voluminous Rule 1925(b) Statements, the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s waiver.

Questions about this case can be directed to Briana Vetter at (267) 861-7584 or bvetter@tthlaw.com.

Coryell v. Morris
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1977 EDA 2021

Decided: January 31, 2025

Domino’s control over its franchisee, Robizza, was sufficient for purposes of vicarious liability for the negligence of Robizza’s employee.

Background

Plaintiffs filed suit against the pizza delivery driver, Morris, the franchisee, Robizza, and the franchisor, Domino’s Pizza, for serious injuries sustained in a motor vehicle accident. The Trial Court denied Domino’s Motion for summary judgment and at trial, the Trial Court denied Domino’s Motion for non-suit. The jury ultimately found that Morris negligently caused the collision and that Domino’s exercised sufficient control over Robizza such that Domino’s was vicariously liable for Plaintiffs’ damages. A split panel of the Superior Court reversed the Trial Court, but Plaintiffs filed a Motion for re-argument en banc, which was granted by the Superior Court. The Superior Court noted the issue before them was whether Domino’s was properly determined to be vicariously liable for negligence of its franchisee’s employee.

In determining whether the relationship between the two parties triggers vicarious liability, the focus is on the control that the principal has over the agent. Further, the Superior Court determined that the jury’s decision to hold Domino’s vicariously liable was supported by the law and evidence. The evidence demonstrated that the franchise agreement and operating standards did not allow Domino’s franchisee the freedom to control day-to-day operations of the store. The record showed that Domino’s exercised such control that Robizza was left with practically no discretion on how to conduct day-to-day operations, and Domino’s used operating standards to continuously subjugate Robizza to Domino’s will as to the store’s staffing and daily operation.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s denial of Domino’s Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because Domino’s control over its franchisee, Robizza, which exceeded mere protection of its brand and trademark, was legally sufficient to deem Robizza its servant or agent for purposes of vicarious liability for the negligence of Robizza’s employee.

Questions about this case can be directed to Randy Burch at (610) 332-7025 or rburch@tthlaw.com.

Musso v. IJump Scranton, LLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 179 E.D.A. 2024 (Pa. Super. 01/27/25)

Decided: January 27, 2025

Pennsylvania Superior Court confirms that an injured minor cannot be subject to a mediation and non-binding arbitration provision set forth in an agreement signed by a minor’s mother.

Background

In this action, the Pennsylvania Superior Court affirmed a Trial Court’s denial to compel arbitration for an injured minor subject to an agreement signed by her mother. A.M., a minor, was injured at Defendant Defy Scranton, a trampoline park. Prior to the injury, A.M.’s mother signed a participation agreement on behalf of herself and A.M. which included a mediation and non-binding arbitration provision. Specifically, the provision stated that “the parties agree to mediation and non-binding arbitration of any and all claims, disputes, and grievances”.

Plaintiff mother, on behalf of A.M., filed a Complaint asserting a cause of action for premises liability. Defendants filed a petition to compel arbitration and stay litigation based upon the participation agreement. The Trial Court denied the Motion due to the Superior Court’s recent decisions in Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, LLC and Shultz v. Sky Zone, LLC, where the Court held that a binding arbitration agreement signed by a minor’s parent is unenforceable against the minor. Defendants appealed.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court first discussed the Trial Court’s reliance on Santiago. Defendants attempted to contend that the case is distinguishable from Santiago because Santiago dealt with binding arbitration and not non-binding arbitration, like the instant matter. Defendants emphasized on appeal that, unlike binding arbitration, the mediation and non-binding arbitration requirement in the provision does not prevent Plaintiff from later filing her claim in the Court of Common Pleas.

The Superior Court disagreed with this argument. In the instant matter, the Superior Court noted that there was no evidence that any court had approved A.M.’s mother as guardian of A.M.’s Estate prior to the mother entering into the participation agreement. Therefore, A.M.’s mother lacked the authority to bind her to the arbitration agreement. Finally, the nature of the arbitration agreement as either binding or non-binding was immaterial to the Superior Court’s analysis because the basis for the Santiago Court’s holding was grounded in the distinction between the authority of a parent as natural guardian and the lack of de facto authority as guardian of the estate of her minor child. Therefore, the Order of the Trial Court was affirmed, denying Defendant’s Petition to compel arbitration and stay litigation.

Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.

The Scranton Club v. Tuscarora Wayne Mut. Group, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 238 MDA 2021

Decided: January 27, 2025

Superior Court affirms dismissal based on Supreme Court precedent that no coverage existed for claims related to the COVID-19 shutdown.

Background

In the Spring of 2020, due to the pandemic, The Scranton Club alleged that it had to cease normal operations and close its business. The Club lodged an insurance claim with Tuscarora Wayne, seeking coverage for alleged damages related to its business interruption. Tuscarora Wayne denied these claims, asserting the absence of any “direct physical loss of or damage to” the insured premises as required under the policy. Additionally, Tuscarora Wayne’s policy contained a virus exclusion which was asserted to preclude coverage. The Scranton Club then filed suit seeking a declaration that its losses in connection with the pandemic were insured under the policy. The Club also alleged bad faith and breach of contract based on the denial of its claim.

TT&H’s Kevin McNamara represented Tuscarora Wayne in this litigation. The Trial Court sustained Tuscarora Wayne’s Preliminary Objections and dismissed all three claims. The Scranton Club then filed an appeal to the Superior Court which reversed in part, and affirmed in part, effectively holding that a viable claim existed. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court subsequently granted allowance of appeal based on Ungarean v. CNA, vacated the Superior Court’s Order, and remanded the case for further consideration.

Holding

On remand, the Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s dismissal of all claims filed by The Scranton Club based on Ungarean. In Ungarean, the policy language at issue was virtually identical to the policy language at issue here. Upon review of Ungarean’s policy with CNA, the Supreme Court determined that no claim for coverage existed due to the COVID-19 shutdown of Ungarean’s business because, for coverage to apply under the CNA Policy, there needed to be a physical alteration to the subject property as a result of a direct physical loss or damage necessitating repairs, rebuilding, or entirely replacing the property. Based on this holding of the Supreme Court, the Superior Court agreed that there was no “physical damage” and therefore nothing that required restoration of The Scranton Club’s property as a result of the COVID-19 shutdown. As such, there was no coverage under the policy.

Questions about this case can be directed to Kevin McNamara at (717) 237-7132 or kmcnamara@tthlaw.com or to Gabrielle Martin at (610) 332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.

Peterson v. Stacy’s Pizza, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2025 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 108

Decided: January 14, 2025

It was not an abuse of discretion to preclude expert who used language “more likely than not”.

Background

Plaintiff was allegedly injured when he was struck by an overhead shutter-style door as he walked through Defendant’s premises. Plaintiff retained a liability expert who opined within reasonable degree of mechanical certainty that improper maintenance of the door “more likely than not” rendered it defective. At trial, Defendant objected to Plaintiff’s liability expert on grounds that the expert did not offer his causation opinion within a reasonable degree of mechanical certainty. The Trial Court sustained the objection and entered a directed verdict in favor of Defendant.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s Order precluding the opinion of the causation liability expert because he used the phrase “more likely than not” when opining on causation, which negated his use of the phrase within a reasonable degree of mechanical certainty.

Questions about this case can be directed to Brook Dirlam at (412) 926-1438 or bdirlam@tthlaw.com.

Wasielewski v. Goebel Ins. Agency, Inc.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2021 EDA 2023

Decided: January 10, 2025

The statute of limitations for the breach of contract cause of action against Goebel for failure to secure adequate coverage for premises liability and workers’ compensation insurance lapsed and the discovery rule exception did not toll the running of the applicable statutory period.

Background

In December 2014, Lee’s Café contacted Goebel about acquiring insurance for the restaurant. Although Lee’s Café sought insurance covering its employees, Goebel procured a policy issued by Erie Insurance Exchange which contained an employer’s liability exclusion and did not provide for workers’ compensation coverage. On March 3, 2016, a Lee’s Café employee received fatal injuries while at work. On March 2, 2018, the employee’s Estate sued Lee’s Café for wrongful death, premises liability, and negligent security. Erie denied coverage and instituted a declaratory judgment action on June 13, 2018, seeking a declaration that it did not owe a duty to defend or indemnity Lee’s Café in the underlying action, citing the policy’s employer’s liability exclusion. Erie obtained summary judgment on November 15, 2019. Lee’s Café settled the underlying action by assigning its rights to the Estate, which filed claims for breach of oral and written contract against Goebel on July 27, 2022, for the alleged failure to secure adequate coverage. Goebel obtained judgment on the pleadings based on the running of the statute of limitations.

Holding

The Court stated that breach of contract actions must be commenced within four years of the date that the cause of action accrues. The breach of contract claim against Goebel, an insurance broker or agent, accrued when the insurer denied coverage due to the broker’s actions and Plaintiff suffered a recognizable loss, that loss here being a claim that would have been covered but for the broker’s failure to secure requested insurance. Thus, the Court held that the cause of action accrued “on, or no later than, June 14, 2018” – the date of the filing of the declaratory judgment action – reasoning that at that time “[Goebel] became liable to [Lee’s Café] for breach of contract.” While Plaintiff contended that before Erie’s summary judgment, damages were only “theoretical and speculative,” the Court distinguished inapposite case law and explained: “Here the loss was decedent’s death, and the damages would flow from Lee’s Café’s liability for the death following Erie’s June 2018 denial of coverage for decedent’s death because of [Goebel’s] . . . failure to procure the requested insurance.” The Court held that the discovery rule exception did not toll the statutory period because Lee’s Café “was aware of this denial.”

Questions about this case can be directed to Javier Zurita at (267)-861-7591 or jzurita@tthlaw.com.

State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Waugh
Pennsylvania Superior Court
1737 MDA 2023

Decided: December 30, 2024

In this unpublished decision, the Superior Court reiterated that a trial court is to consider the arbitrability of a matter at the preliminary objections stage, and shall permit parties to engage in discovery to construct a record on which to base a determination.

Background

Additional Defendant Mitchell filed Preliminary Objections to the Joinder Complaint of Defendant Waugh based on a prior agreement of the parties that addressed, among other things, alternative dispute resolution. No discovery on the existence of a valid agreement to arbitrate was conducted. The Trial Court overruled the Preliminary Objections, finding it premature and not ripe for resolution at the preliminary objections stage. Mitchell appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the Trial Court applied the wrong legal standard; erred in ruling the request was premature; and erred in refusing to consider evidence or discovery.

Holding

The Superior Court’s review of a trial court order denying preliminary objections in the nature of a petition to compel arbitration is limited to determining whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence and whether the trial court abused its discretion. Whether a written contract to arbitrate existed and whether the parties’ dispute is within the scope of the arbitration agreement are questions of law subject to plenary review.

The Superior reiterated the strong public policy in favor of enforcing arbitration agreements and found that the Trial Court’s failure, to determine whether the dispute was arbitrable at the preliminary objection stage, an abuse of discretion. In light of the assertion that an agreement to arbitrate existed and the denial of same by the adverse party, the Trial Court was required to consider evidence tangential to the pleadings, including deposition testimony and other evidence obtained through discovery. The Trial Court Order was vacated, and the case was remanded to the Trial Court to construct a record on which it could base a determination on the validity and existence of an arbitration agreement.

Questions about this case can be directed to Laura Daube at (717) 441-3955 or ldaube@tthlaw.com.