eNotes: Liability – May 2023 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Santiago v. Philly Trampoline Park, LLC
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super. 47

Decided: March 21, 2023

Parents as natural guardians, without more, cannot not bind minor children to arbitration agreements. Further, without evidence of apparent authority, a spouse cannot bind the other spouse to an agreement to arbitrate.

Background

A minor, R.S. was injured at the trampoline park, Sky Zone. Prior to participating in the activities, R.S.’s father, Mr. Schultz, signed a 6-page document that contained an arbitration provision and a waiver of liability that purported to apply to the minor child, “spouse” and “respective . . . parent” of the minor child. Mrs. Schultz filed suit for her son’s injuries and for her own losses related to medical care. Sky Zone filed a Petition to compel arbitration and stay the suit. Following discovery on the issue, the Lower Court denied the Petition, finding that Mrs. Schultz was not bound by the agreement signed by R.S.’s father and, further, parents lacked the authority to waive a child’s right to file a lawsuit for their injuries.

Similarly, the Santiago children were also injured at Sky Zone. Their mother, Mrs. Santiago, executed the same document. The parents, husband and wife, filed suit on behalf of their minor child and in their own right. Sky Zone again file a Petition to transfer to arbitration. Mr. and Mrs. Santiago argued that the mother’s signature could not bind her child or spouse. The Trial Court denied the Petition and Sky Zone’s Motion for immediate appeal. Sky Zone filed a Petition with the Superior Court for permission for immediate appeal. On the Petition, the Superior Court held that the denial of a Petition to transfer to arbitration was an immediately appealable order as of right and considered Sky Zone’s Petition as a Notice of Appeal.

Holding

The Superior Court reiterated the two-part test to be considered on a Petition to compel arbitration: (1) does a valid agreement exist and (2) is the dispute within the scope of the agreement. Sky Zone argued that Mrs. Santiago had the apparent authority to bind her spouse. The Court disagreed that the familial relationship, alone, could imbue Mrs. Santiago with authority to bind her spouse, and without some communication by Mr. Santiago to Sky Zone, the agreement could not bind him. Similarly, as to Schultz, the fact that Mr. Shultz may have signed an agreement for R.S. to play soccer on one occasion could not be said to suggest that Sky Zone knew that Mr. Shultz could sign on Mrs. Schultz’s behalf. The fact that R.S. had been to Sky Zone before, without any evidence that Mrs. Schultz was aware of the provision or that she had executed a similar agreement, was insufficient to bind Mrs. Schultz. As it relates to the children, the Court determined as an issue of first impression, that parents, in their role as natural guardians, have no authority to bind minor children to an arbitration agreement. The Court acknowledged that minors cannot bind themselves to an arbitration agreement. As such, minors lack the capacity to grant express authority for an agent to sign on their behalf. A parent has no right to “intermeddle” in the property of a minor, and a cause of action is property. Thus, a parent’s role as natural guardians, without more, did not grant them the authority to bind minors to the arbitration agreement. The decision to deny the Petitions to enforce arbitration was affirmed.

Questions about this case can be directed to Rebecca Sember-Izsak at (412) 926-1446 or rsember@tthlaw.com.

Shanfelt v. Progressive Advanced Ins. Co.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
2023 Pa. Super Unpub. LEXIS 686, 2023 WL 2583846

Decided: March 21, 2023

A litigant waived an issue raised in the appellate brief, but omitted from the statement of issues on appeal, contrary to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).

Background

Plaintiff was injured in a 2021 motor vehicle accident. She demanded stacked underinsured motorists benefits pursuant to her father’s policy. The insurer refused to provide stacked benefits because Plaintiff’s father had waived stacking in 2012. However, over the years, there were changes to the policy, with certain vehicles being deleted and others added. No new waivers of stacking were obtained. The insurance company defended on the basis that no new waivers were required. The Lower Court agreed and granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of the insurer.

After Plaintiff filed an appeal, the Court issued an Order, pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), requiring the Plaintiff to file a Statement of the issues on appeal. Although Plaintiff complied, her statement did not call into question the Court’s refusal to permit discovery on allegedly disputed factual issues relating to the addition of new vehicles to the policy. Thus, the Court did not address in its Opinion any issues pertaining to discovery. Nonetheless, in her Appellate Brief, Plaintiff contended that the judgment on the pleadings was premature because such discovery should have been permitted.

Holding

The Superior Court deemed the sole issue raised in her Brief to be waived because the Plaintiff did not include it within her Statement of issues on appeal. The Superior Court explained that the purposes of Rule 1925 are to facilitate appellate review and to provide the parties and the public with the legal basis for a judicial decision. To that end, the rule requires the aggrieved party to identify each error intended to be raised on appeal to enable the court to address them in the Court’s Opinion. The failure to include an issue in the Statement waives it for the purposes of the appeal.

Questions about this case can be directed to Louis Long at (412) 926-1424 or llong@tthlaw.com.

Shifflett v. Mengel
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1517 MDA 2021

Decided: March 20, 2023

Trial Court did not err in charging jury on causation, independent of the standard jury instructions, where the entirety of the charge fully and adequately conveyed applicable law.

Background

Immediately after a motor vehicle accident, Plaintiff stepped out of her vehicle, which had been pushed off the road from the accident, and sprained her ankle while stepping in a culvert. Plaintiff sought damages for the ankle sprain, contending that Defendant’s negligence put her in the place where she was injured. Despite admitted negligence at trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Defendant for lack of causation due to the negligence.

On appeal to the Superior Court, Plaintiff claimed that the Trial Court erred when it instructed the jury that Plaintiff was required to prove harm from the accident, instead of Defendant’s negligence and included the “substantial factor” language in the causation charge, rather than the standard SSJI instruction. Plaintiff failed to develop the claim relative to the distinction between the accident vs. the negligence as the causative factor, so the Court deemed the argument waived. The Court noted that while the SSJI are instructive, they are not binding on the Trial Court, and a trial judge has wide latitude in his/her choice of language when charging a jury. The Court held that although the Trial Court’s charge did not mirror the language set forth in the SSJI instruction, the charge, as a whole, accurately recited the law pertaining to causation which did not change any essential element of the burden of the proof or create prejudice to any party.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the judgment in favor of Defendant. Although the jury charge did not mirror the standard jury instructions, the charge fully and adequately recited the applicable law such that a new trial was not warranted.

Questions about this case can be directed to James F. Swartz, III at (610) 332-7028 or jswartz@tthlaw.com.

Tabb v. Thomas
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 72 EDA 2022

Decided: March 2, 2023

Amended Complaint untimely filed deemed a nullity.

Background

Robert Tabb fell on the premises of John Thomas on July 30, 2018 and suffered personal injuries. On July 6, 2020, within the two-year statute of limitations, Tabb filed a Writ of summons, which he then reinstated several times. Tab filed a Complaint on April 18, 2021, raising claims of negligence and breach of written contract. The Complaint was not verified, and Tabb did not attach the operative written contract. On May 20, 2021, Thomas filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that the counts in the Complaint were not pleaded with specificity to prepare a defense, that Tabb failed to attach the written contract to the complaint, and that Tabb failed to attach a Verification. Tabb did not reply to the Preliminary Objections. On June 14, 2021, the Trial Court granted Thomas’s Preliminary Objections, finding that Tabb’s entire Complaint was stricken for failing to provide a Verification, and, additionally, that the breach of contract claim was stricken for failing to attach the written contract.

Without seeking leave of court or agreement from Thomas, on September 15, 2021, Tabb filed an Amended Complaint, raising the same claims but alleging that the breach of contract claim was based on an oral lease agreement. Thomas filed Preliminary Objections, arguing that the Amended Complaint was untimely and was filed without seeking leave of court or permission from Thomas. Tabb then filed a Second and Third Amended Complaint, neither with leave of court or permission from Thomas, which were met with Preliminary Objections on that basis. On November 17, 2021, the Trial Court granted Thomas’ final Preliminary Objections, finding that Tabb failed to seek leave of court or agreement from Thomas to file the Amended Complaint, and that Tabb’s Amended Complaints were void and stricken. The Court dismissed the action with prejudice. Tabb appealed, arguing that he should not be punished to failing to observe technical rules to seek leave to file his Amended Complaint, and that Thomas did not suffer prejudice because he was aware of Tabb’s claims.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed, citing Rule 1028(c)(1) of the Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a party an automatic right to file an amended complaint within twenty (20) days after the filing of preliminary objections, as well as Rule 1033(a), which obligates a plaintiff to obtain the defendant’s consent or leave of court to file an amended complaint after the expiration of those 20 days. The Court found that Plaintiff followed neither rule and, therefore, waived his claims.

Questions about this case can be directed to Julia Morrison at (717) 441-7056 or jmorrison@tthlaw.com.

Wilmer v. Bethman
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 654 EDA 2022, 2023 Pa. Super. Unpub. LEXIS 392

Decided: February 21, 2023

Jury finding of no negligence was upheld where Defendant made left hand turn in front of Plaintiff’s vehicle.

Background

Bethman was driving east on Street Road in Hatboro. Street Road has two lanes in each direction, with a speed limit of forty-five miles per hour. Bethman pulled into a center turning lane, attempting to turn left. A police officer’s vehicle was stopped in the opposing left turn lane, blocking some of Bethman’s vision of the second lane of traffic. The officer made a gesture to Bethman to proceed with her turn. She successfully navigated the first lane of opposing traffic but was struck in the rear, passenger quarter, by a van in the second lane of traffic. Wilmer was the front seat passenger of that van. Airbags in the van deployed, and Wilmer sustained facial and other alleged injuries.

At trial, at the end of her case, Wilmer moved for judgment as a matter of law asserting Bethman had violated the Motor Vehicle Code provision governing left hand turns and was therefore negligent per se. The Trial Court denied the Motion. Wilmer renewed the Motion at the conclusion of Bethman’s case, and the Trial Court denied the Motion again. The jury was then instructed on both negligence and negligence per se. The jury found that Bethman was not negligent. Wilmer moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (“JNOV”), and the Trial Court denied the Motion. Further post-trial Motions were also denied. Wilmer then appealed, arguing that it was error to deny Wilmer’s Motions for directed verdict and for JNOV, that the verdict of no negligence was contrary to the evidence warranting a new trial, and that there were alleged defects in the jury charge and verdict sheet.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed. The Court held the Trial Court properly found that there was sufficient evidence presented that Bethman waited until she believed it was safe to proceed. Further, the Superior Court highlighted the lack of any evidence from Wilmer demonstrating how far the van was from the site of the collision when Bethman proceeded with her left hand turn. Thus, there was no evidence presented that Bethman failed to yield the right-of-way in a manner which would constitute a hazard. The Superior Court held that the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by denying any of Wilmer’s Motions. Similarly, they held that there was no abuse of discretion in the instructions to the jury or in the preparation of the verdict sheet.

Questions about this case can be directed to Logan Nagle at (717) 255-7234 or lnagle@tthlaw.com.

Evans v. Hostetter
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 39 MDA 2022

Decided: February 17, 2023

Employees who negligently injure another in the same employ are immune from suit, without regard to whether the negligent act occurred in the course and scope of employment.

Background

Employee was injured when two other employees, who were “wildly running about and horsing around,” ran into her as she was clocking out. The employee received workers’ compensation benefits and filed suit against the two co-employees. The co-employees filed Preliminary Objections in the nature of a demurrer, asserting that the claims were barred by the coworker immunity provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act (“WCA”). That provision grants immunity to employees who negligently injure another person “in the same employ,” as long as the injury is compensable under the WCA. (The provision contains an exception for injury caused by an “intentional wrong,” which was not alleged in this case.) The Trial Court sustained the Preliminary Objections and dismissed the action.

On appeal, the injured employee argued that immunity did not apply because the co-employees were not on the clock or working at the time of the incident, and were not within the course and scope of employment but engaging in horseplay. Regarding the co-employees being off the clock, the Court relied on precedent that an injury is compensable if sustained at a time “reasonably proximate to work hours.” Regarding the co-employees being outside the course and scope of employment, the Superior Court held that it was bound by the statutory language “in the same employ.” The Court noted the legislature’s omission of any reference to “course and scope of employment” in the coworker immunity provision. The term “in the same employ” focuses on the employment status of the persons who caused the injury rather than on their actions. Whether the co-employees were engaging in horseplay was irrelevant to whether they were in the same employ as the injured person, which requires only that they worked for the same employer.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the Trial Court’s Order sustaining the Defendants’ Preliminary Objections and dismissing the claims pursuant to the WCA’s coworker immunity provision.

Questions about this case can be directed to Karin M. Romano at (412) 926-1426 or kromano@tthlaw.com.