eNotes: Liability – November 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Spinelli v. Fallon
Pennsylvania Superior Court
Nos. 892 EDA 2023, 893 EDA 2023

Decided: August 22, 2024

Superior Court reverses the Trial Court’s grant of Preliminary Objections because it erred in ruling that the lis pendens doctrine applied.

Background

The dispute stemmed from an automobile accident that rendered Plaintiff Courtney Spinelli, an “incapacitated person.” After the accident, the Orphans’ Court in Delaware County Court of Common Pleas appointed Spinelli’s estranged husband, Rocco Spinelli, as Co-Guardian of Plaintiff’s Estate, who retained the services of attorneys employed by Cozen O’Connor to recover for personal injuries related to the accident. Subsequently, in December 2020, Plaintiff, who had then obtained a new guardian of the Estate, filed a Petition to compel an accounting against Rocco Spinelli for alleged inaccuracies and misreports on the personal injury settlement moneys and legal fees paid to Cozen O’Connor. In September 2021, Plaintiff filed a surcharge Petition with the Orphans’ Court and sought a surcharge against Rocco Spinelli, Fallon (a now-deceased Cozen attorney), and Cozen O’Connor, jointly and severally.

While Plaintiff’s request for a surcharge remained pending, Plaintiff filed a separate action in the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas, raising several causes of action: “breach of fiduciary duty, aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, conversion, legal malpractice, and civil conspiracy.” That complaint named four Defendants: Rocco Spinelli, Fallon, Promislo (a separate attorney employed by Cozen), and Cozen O’Connor. The Cozen Defendants and Spinelli asserted Preliminary Objections on the grounds of the pendency of the prior action. The Trial Court sustained Preliminary Objections and dismissed the Complaint with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.

Holding

When two lawsuits are pending, the doctrine of lis pendens “permits the dismissal of the newer suit if both suits involve the same parties, the same relief requested, the same causes of action, and the same rights asserted.” This assessment is a question of law “determinable from an inspection of the records in the two causes,” including the “substantive elements” of each cause of action. The Court first held that Plaintiff “did not make any allegations of wrongdoing against Promislo,” thus defeating the first requirement. The Court also examined the causes of action and held that they differed because an action for surcharge, an equitable power reserved to the Orphans’ Court, requires proving the Guardian’s “failure to meet the required standard of care” as Guardian of the Estate, which elements were not implicated in the civil counts. Moreover, the Court held that the type of relief did not exactly match, despite both actions seeking monetary damages, as the Orphans’ Court could not assess punitive and compensatory damages. Lis pendens does not apply even if a factual overlap between two cases exists, as the doctrine’s elements must be strictly met.

Questions about this case can be directed to Javier Zurita at (267) 861-7591 or jzurita@tthlaw.com.

Rotert v. Hopkins
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 84 EDA 2024

Decided: August 15, 2024

Whether a litigant assumed the risk is a question of law as part of the court’s duty analysis and not a matter for jury determination.

Background

Plaintiff was standing in the center of a dog park and observed Defendant Hopkins throw a ball a few times to his dogs in Plaintiff’s direction. The first time Defendant Hopkins threw the ball, Plaintiff backed up. Then, one of Defendant’s dogs ran into Plaintiff, causing him to fall back onto Defendant’s two other dogs and sustain injuries. The park is a free run dog park. Park rules state: “Dog Handler is responsible for the behavior of their dogs;” “Handler must remain in the park, supervising their dogs at all times;” “You are financially responsible for any injury caused by your dog;” and “Use park at your own risk.”

Plaintiffs filed a Complaint in negligence against Defendants Hopkins and Suzanne Potter (Hopkins’ partner and co-owner of the dogs). Defendants’ Motion for summary judgment asserted that Plaintiffs could not establish that Defendants owed them a duty of care due to the assumption of risk. Specifically, Defendants argued they owed Plaintiff no duty of care because once Mr. Rotert chose to stand in the middle of the dog park, he assumed the risk. However, Plaintiffs contended that Defendant Hopkins had a duty to direct his dogs in a manner so as not to cause harm to him and that Defendant Hopkins should have known that by throwing a ball over Mr. Rotert’s head, it would direct the dogs in Mr. Roter’s direction.

The Trial Court found that Plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury when he voluntarily remained in the general area where Defendant Hopkins was throwing the ball to his dogs and “reasonable minds could not disagree that one assumes the risk of colliding with a dog when standing in a dog park with unleased dogs running around in close proximity.” The Court thus concluded that because Plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of negligence, there was no issue of material fact warranting submission of the case to a jury.

Holding

On appeal, the Superior Court stated that in a negligence action, the question whether a litigant had assumed the risk is a question of law as part of the court’s duty analysis and not a matter for jury determination. A defendant will establish assumption of the risk as a matter of law “only where it is beyond question that the plaintiff voluntarily and knowingly proceeded in the face of an obvious and dangerous condition.” In order to prevail on assumption of risk, the defendant must establish both the awareness of the risk and voluntariness on the part of the plaintiff. While deeming Plaintiffs’ argument on appeal as waived for unrelated procedural issues, the Superior Court held that even if it were not waived, the claim would fail. The Court reiterated that assumption of risk is solely a question of law. Thus, the trial court – and not a jury – properly decides the question. Therefore, the Trial Court properly concluded that Plaintiff could not make out a prima facie case of negligence and entered summary judgment in Defendants’ favor.

Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.

McNeal v. M&J Auto Repair
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 2507 EDA 2023

Decided: August 14, 2024

Pennsylvania Superior Court holds that a Motion to amend the pleadings and judgment filed beyond the two-year limitations period for a negligence claim is not automatically barred pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1033.

Background

In this negligence action, Plaintiff was bitten by a dog in April 2019 while she was receiving services from a business referred to as “M&J Auto Repair” in Philadelphia. She filed suit in June 2020 alleging that the owner or owners of the business operated on the premises were negligent. Defendants were originally identified as “M&J Auto Repair” or, alternatively, Defendants with the fictitious names, “John Does No. 1 through X” and “XYZ Companies 1-10.” An Answer to the Complaint was filed on September 28, 2020, on behalf of “M&J Auto Repair,” verified by a Marvin Morris.

Plaintiff filed a Praecipe to enter judgment against M&J in July 2022 and judgment was entered on that date. Over a year later, on July 19, 2023, Plaintiff moved to amend the caption on the judgment and all other filings in the matter to identify the defendant as “Marvin Morris, a/k/a Marvin Morrin, doing business as M&J Auto Repair and M&J’s Auto Body, Unregistered Fictitious Names.” The Trial Court granted the Motion and Morris appealed. On appeal, among other contentions, Morris argued that the amendment of the judgment was barred by the statute of limitations under Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033(b) because Plaintiff’s Motion to amend the pleadings and judgment was filed beyond the two-year limitations period for her negligence claim.

Holding

The Superior Court reviewed the language of Pa.R.Civ.P. 1033(a) which permits Plaintiff to seek an amendment correcting the name of a party by leave of court at any time. Rule 1033(b) allows this correction of a party’s name as long as (1) Plaintiff’s cause of action in the original pleading remained unchanged, (2) Morris received notice of the “commencement of the action” no more than “90 days after the period provided by law for commencing the action”, (3) Morris was notified of the action such that he was not prejudiced in maintaining a defense, and (4) Morris “knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against [him] but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper party.”

The Trial Court found that all four elements of Rule 1033 were met as Plaintiff’s underlying claim against M&J Auto Repair was the same claim she directed against Morris by way of her requested amendment, and there was evidence in the record that Morris was fully appraised of the allegations in the pleadings by signing the verification to the Answer to Complaint.

Questions about this case can be directed to Taryn Vender at (570) 825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.

Bywater v. Conemaugh Mem’l Med. Ctr.
Pennsylvania Superior Court
No. 1072 WDA 2023

Decided: August 5, 2024

Summary judgment affirmed in slip-and-fall action where Plaintiff did not know what caused her fall and simply assumed it was black ice.

Background

Plaintiff drove to the medical center with her sister-in-law and parked her vehicle in the parking lot. Plaintiff then exited the driver’s side of the vehicle without looking down and she immediately “went up and . . . came down on the side of [her] car” before ultimately landing on the ground. Plaintiff’s sister-in-law did not see the fall. Plaintiff never saw ice on the ground. After she fell, Plaintiff looked around and “there was nothing there.” She simply assumed that she slipped on black ice, since “you can’t see black ice.”

Summary judgment was granted because Plaintiff offered no evidence from which a jury could find that the Defendant had notice of the allegedly dangerous parking lot.

Holding

The Superior Court affirmed the grant of summary judgment. The Court held that permitting the case to proceed, despite Plaintiff not knowing what caused her fall, would result in the jury engaging in improper conjecture and guesswork.

Questions about this case can be directed to Danielle Vols at (570) 825-6890 or dvols@tthlaw.com.