eNotes: Workers’ Compensation – December 2024 – Pennsylvania

SIGNIFICANT CASE SUMMARIES

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Riehl v. Beiler Bros., LLC
No. 1563 C.D. 2023
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Decided: November 18, 2024

Section 410 applied where a claimant died before the final adjudication of his claim, regardless of the cause of death.

Background

The Claimant sustained disabling work-related injuries in October 2011, for which he was receiving temporary total disability (TTD) benefits. Thereafter, in June 2020, he filed a petition to convert his TTD benefits to specific loss benefits. While said petition was pending before the Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ) on remand from the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Board), the Claimant died from sepsis resulting from bedsores caused by his work-related injury. The Claimant’s widow continued the litigation, but the Board denied the petition as moot because the Claimant died from his work injuries, thereby precluding payment of specific loss benefits under Section 306(g).

Holding

Section 306(g) governs specific loss benefits where the cause of death is not work related, whereas Section 307 governs fatal claim benefits where the cause of death is work related. Section 410, on the other hand, does not condition a surviving dependent’s receipt of benefits on the cause of the claimant’s death. Section 410 applies when a claimant dies before the final adjudication of their claim, allowing payment of the compensation due to the claimant up to the date of death to be paid to dependents or the claimant’s estate. Here, the Court determined that Section 410 applied. The Court distinguished this case from previous cases where Section 410 was found not to apply, as Claimant’s petition to convert benefits was actively pending litigation at the time of his death, satisfying Section 410’s requirements. The Court held that applying Section 410 in this case would not conflict with Sections 306(g) and 307, which govern the heritability of benefits based on the cause of death, because Section 410 looks back to the period between the filing of the claim and the claimant’s death, regardless of the cause of death.

Takeaway

The operation of Section 410 of the Workers’ Compensation Act, 77 P.S. § 751, which requires payment of compensation to surviving dependents or the estate when a claimant dies before final adjudication, is mandatory and not waivable if its requirements are met.

Questions about this case can be directed to Cailey Farinaro at 610-332-7008 or cfarinaro@tthlaw.com.

Elliot v. City of Pittsburgh (WCAB)
No. 1225 C.D. 2023
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Decided: November 14, 2024

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Claimant’s 500 week TPD limit despite his argument that the IRE was constitutionally invalid

Background

The Claimant sustained an August 2003 work injury and received temporary total disability (TTD). He underwent an IRE in December 2012 that returned an impairment rating of 9%. Claimant’s status was changed back to TPD as of the December 2012 IRE. The Claimant did not appeal that determination, which limited him to 500 weeks of TPD benefits. In June 2017, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down Protz II, which held the IRE statute unconstitutional on non-delegation doctrine grounds. The IRE process was restored in Act 111 of 2018. In April of 2021 (before Claimant’s 500 weeks of TPD ceased), he filed a reinstatement petition attempting to restore his TTD status as of the December 2012 IRE pursuant to Protz II. The WCJ granted the petition as of April 2021 because Claimant did not previously appeal the constitutionality of the IRE. The Claimant underwent another IRE in September of 2021 that returned an impairment rating of 8%. The WCJ granted the Employer’s petition, returning him to TPD as of September 2021. The Claimant appealed to the Board, challenging the constitutionality of Act 111’s credit provisions. While that was pending on appeal, he filed the instant reinstatement petition, again challenging the constitutionality of Act 111’s credit provisions, but on different grounds.

Holding

The Court emphasized the holding of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that the void ab initio doctrine is no longer the automatic approach for application of a judicial decision finding a statute invalid and only claimants whose IREs were being litigated or appealed on the basis of non-delegation at the time Protz II was issued were eligible for TTD restoration as of their pre-Protz IREs. Additionally, while claimants do have a certain right to benefits until they are found ineligible, there is no vested right in total disability status because an employer may challenge the status.

Takeaway

If a claimant did not challenge the constitutionality of an IRE before Protz, they cannot rely on this argument in attempting to restore TTD benefits.

Questions about this case can be directed to Gabrielle Martin at 610-332-7003 or gmartin@tthlaw.com.

Borough of Hollidaysburg v. Detwiler (WCAB)
No. 739 C.D. 2023
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

Decided: November 19, 2024

A Claimant must provide timely notice of an injury within 120 days of knowing, or by reasonable diligence should know, of the injury possible connection to their work.

Background

In December of 2014, the Claimant, a volunteer firefighter, was diagnosed with cancer and told the Fire Chief of his diagnosis but did not ask for an injury report and was not provided with one. In December 2019, the Claimant filed a Claim Petition for an occupational disease under Section 108(r) of the PA Workers’ Compensation Act. The Claim Petition alleged the Claimant’s cancer was caused by his exposure to Group 1 carcinogens while working as a volunteer firefighting for the Employer. The Claimant did not initially believe his cancer was related to his firefighting at the time of his diagnosis. He only learned of this possibility years later at a firefighting training in early 2019 that mentioned Act 46. The Claimant sought the benefit of the rebuttable presumption of Section 301(f), which if met establishes the Claimant’s cancer is work related. The WCJ granted the Claim Petition finding the Claimant had provided sufficient notice and had met his burden of showing a causal link between his cancer and his firefighting through the 301(f) presumption. Employer appealed to the Appeal Board, which affirmed the WCJ. Employer then appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

Holding

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Appeal Board’s decision, holding that Claimant had met his burden for his Claim Petition. Regarding notice, the Court applied the Stahl case and the reasonable diligence standard, which was a case handled by TT&H. The Court held that Claimant acted with reasonable diligence to discover a connection between his cancer and fire service after attending the training on Act 46. Section 311 of the Act requires that a claimant give notice of their injury to their Employer within 120 days of either the injury itself or when the claimant “knows, or by the exercise of reasonable diligence should know, of the existence of the injury and its possible relationship to his employment.” Therefore, the Claimant provided sufficient notice by obtaining counsel and filing the necessary paperwork within 120 days of the training where he learned of the possible connection between his work and cancer diagnosis.

Takeaway

This case reaffirms the reasonable diligence standard in Stahl and shows that the 120 notice period is not only triggered by the eventual receipt of a medical opinion relating cancer to firefighting. Rather, the claimant must exercise reasonable diligence to discover the possible link between firefighting and cancer.

It should also be noted that Judge Leavitt in her dissent provides some possible arguments for Employers regarding the “continuous firefighting duties” requirement of Section 301(f). Judge Leavitt points out that mere employment with a fire department for at least four years is not consistent with the text of the statute. Judge Leavitt criticized the majority for not analyzing sufficiently the nature of the fire calls the Claimant responded to and focusing on the number of years alone.

Questions about this case can be directed to Shelby A. Bennett at sbennett@tthlaw.com.

Thomas v. SYSCO Foods (WCAB)
No. 156 EAL 2024
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Allocatur granted: November 5, 2024

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court will review the burden of proof in a Modification/Suspension Petition where the Claimant is a union member entitled to union benefits.

Background

The Claimant, a union member, injured his leg in a work-related injury in July 2016, resulting in a compensable injury and eventual amputation. In 2019, the Employer filed a Modification Petition based upon an earning capacity evaluation which showed that the Claimant had a higher earning capacity than previously determined. The WCJ denied the Employer’s Modification Petition. While the WCJ found the Claimant able to return to work, the WCJ also ruled that the Employer failed to offer credible evidence that there were no light duty jobs available for the Claimant at the time-of-injury employer and failed to meet its burden of proving there were no light duty jobs available. The Board reversed the WCJ’s decision, finding that the Claimant has the burden to show a specific and suitable position available with the Employer to give rise to a duty on the part of the Employer to disprove the suitability or availability of the position. The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board, citing Rosenberg v. Pike County (WCAB), 942 A.2d 245 (Pa. Cmmw. Ct. 2008), which established that an employer does not have the burden to prove the non-existence of available work at its own facility as a necessary element of a Modification Petition. The Commonwealth Court held that if a claimant presented evidence of a specific job vacancy that he was capable of performing, then an employer would have the burden to rebut this evidence.

Supreme Court Grants Allocator

On November 5, 2024, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania granted, in part, Claimant’s Petition for Allocator. The Court stated that its review would be limited to the question of whether the burden-shifting established under Rosenberg applies when the injured worker is a long-term member of a union with significant seniority subject to a collective bargaining agreement, as Claimant contends the positions proposed by Employer were not “available” because they would result in him, as well as other potential injured union workers, forfeiting union benefits.

Takeaway

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to grant allocatur on this decision is a troubling development in Workers’ Compensation laws in the Commonwealth. For nearly two decades, Rosenberg held that while Section 306(b)(2) of the Act requires an employer to offer a specific job vacancy to a claimant if a clamant can perform it, only “once the issue is raised by evidence of a possible opening with employer” does the employer have the burden of proof. Section 306(b)(2), in its statutory language, is silent on what party bears the burden of proof; therefore, the decision in Rosenberg established the burden framework in 2008. In this instant matter, the Commonwealth Court ruled that Claimant presented no evidence of a specific job opening with Employer. Absent some evidence that an employer has an open and available position within a claimant’s work restrictions, an employer does not need to prove it does not have such a position available, pursuant to Rosenberg. By granting allocatur, it appears that the Supreme Court will revisit this burden of proof framework, and perhaps shift the burden onto the employer.

Questions about this case can be directed Taryn Vender at 570-825-4794 or tvender@tthlaw.com.