eNotes: Workers’ Compensation – March 2024 – Pennsylvania

Pennsylvania Case Summaries

Martinez v. Lewis Tree Service (WCAB)
Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania
No. 298 C.D. 2023

Decided February 8, 2024

A tree trimmer was found to be a traveling employee acting within course of scope of employment.

Background

The Claimant was employed as a crew leader for Employer’s tree-trimming business. On October 1, 2021, while driving home in his personal vehicle at the end of the workday, he was involved in a motor vehicle accident and sustained various injuries. On a typical workday, the Claimant drove his personal vehicle to the “yard” where the Employer’s trucks were parked. From there, he drove the Employer’s truck to the job site. At the end of the workday, the Claimant returned to the yard where he retrieved his personal vehicle and drove home. The Employer’s yard changed several times per year, depending on the location of the tree-trimming jobs. The Employer did not have a fixed yard for its trucks and equipment. The Claimant filed a Claim Petition alleging that he was a traveling employee with no fixed place of business. The workers’ compensation judge (WCJ) denied the Claim Petition, finding that the Claimant was not acting within the course and scope of his employment at the time of the motor vehicle accident. Specifically, the WCJ found that the Claimant was not a traveling employee. Therefore, the injuries he sustained during the commute to and from work were not within the course and scope of employment. The Claimant appealed to the Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board, which affirmed. The Claimant then appealed to the Commonwealth Court.

Holding

The Commonwealth Court affirmed the Board’s decision, concluding that the Claimant was not furthering the business affairs of the Employer while commuting home in his own vehicle. In doing so, the Court examined the “coming and going” rule and its exceptions. Under the “coming and going” rule, injuries sustained during an employee’s commute to and from work are not compensable unless: (1) the employment contract included transportation to and from work; (2) the employee has no fixed place of work; (3) the employee is on a special assignment; or (4) special circumstances are such that the employee was furthering the business of the employer. In holding that the Claimant was not a traveling employee because he had a fixed place of work, the Court relied upon the fact that the Claimant drove his personal vehicle to and from the yard, not the Employer’s vehicle. In other words, the Claimant’s workday began at the Employer’s yard, not his home. The Court further reasoned that a traveling employee is one whose travel in his own vehicle is essential to serving and furthering the employer’s interests, like an over-the-road truck driver or a traveling salesman.

Takeaway

Course and scope of employment cases are highly fact-specific. With this case on the books, even if a claimant reports to a “fixed” location for a short period of time to receive a work assignment, this may be sufficient to deny compensability under the “coming and going” rule. If there is any question that the claimant may have been outside of the course and scope of employment at the time of the alleged injury, extensive investigation must be conducted before making a determination on the compensability of the claim.

Questions about this case can be directed to A. Catherine McLaughlin at (412) 926-1421 or cmclaughlin@tthlaw.com.

Ferreria v. West German Motor Imports et al.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania
No. 744 EDA 2023

Decided February 15, 2024

A plaintiff must plead facts sufficient to invoke the personal animus exception to the exclusive remedy clause to survive a motion to dismiss.

Background

The Plaintiff was an employee of an autobody detailer and was injured during the course of an assault while at work. Specifically, The Plaintiff sustained injuries that were allegedly the product of an assault for personal reasons, not due to reasons related to work. Plaintiff filed a suit against his assailants and his Employer for negligence. The Employer filed a Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings arguing that the exclusive remedy clause of the Pennsylvania Workers’ Compensation Act barred the action. The Plaintiff argued that 77 P.S. § 411(1), Section 301(c)(1) excludes from Workers’ Compensation coverage injuries intentionally inflicted by third parties, or better known as “personal animus.” The Trial Court granted the Motion for Judgement on the Pleadings, finding that the Plaintiff did not specifically plead that the attack was caused by personal animus causing the injuries to be sustained outside the course and scope of employment. Without such a pleading, the injuries would fall under the umbrella of the Workers’ Compensation Act, with Workers’ Compensation benefits being the exclusive remedy. The Plaintiff appealed.

Holding

The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the Decision, agreeing that there were no pleadings or evidence submitted indicating there was a prior relationship or external factors outside of work that would remove the injury from occurring within the course and scope of employment. The Superior Court mainly relied on the pleadings and indicated that as this exception to the Workers’ Compensation Act was not specifically pled, the only remedy the injured worker is left to pursue is through Workers’ Compensation.

Takeaway

This is an interesting analysis, in that it fell on the fact that the Plaintiff filed a Complaint with pleadings insufficient to remove the alleged injury from the course and scope of employment. The Opinion was clear that if this had been alleged, whether the injury was sustained in the course and scope of employment would be considered a question of fact and the granting of the Motion of the Judgment on the Pleadings would have likely been in error. This ruling goes to support the strength of the exclusive remedy provision of the Act, and the high burden sustained by all employers seeking to remove an injury from the course and scope of employment standard. However, this should serve as a reminder that the exclusive remedy clause of the Act can serve as a shield to liability claims where damages can be more substantial.

Questions about this case can be directed to Caroline E. Gentilcore at (908) 528-2600 or cgentilcore@tthlaw.com.